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  INTRODUCTION	  “Plagiarism	  is	  necessary,	  progress	  implies	  it.”1	  Michalis	  Pichler	  	  With	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	   digital	   technology,	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   has	   ushered	   in	   a	   quantum	   increase	   in	   the	  ways	   to	   create,	  disseminate,	   and	   commercially	   exploit	   creativity.	   	   Digital	   technology	  allows	  anyone	   to	   create	  perfect	  digital	   copies	  of	  protected	  works	   in	   the	  comfort	   of	   their	   homes	   and	   to	   distribute	   them	   to	   tens,	   hundreds,	  thousands,	  and	  even	  millions	  of	  people	  with	  the	  click	  of	  a	  hyperlink	  via	  a	  handheld	   device.	   	   Indeed,	   copyright	   touches	   more	   ordinary	   people	   in	  substantial	   ways	   in	   this	   age	   of	   information	   than	   at	   any	   other	   time	   in	  American	  copyright	  history.2	  The	   copy-­‐and-­‐paste	   reality	   and	   firmly	   entrenched	   user	   expectations	  to	   access,	   reuse,	   remix,	   and	   share	   creative	   output	   instantly	   via	   e-­‐mail,	  blogs,	   and	   social	   networks	   are	   far	   afield	   from	  what	   Congress	   originally	  contemplated	  when	  it	  responded	  to	  its	  constitutional	  call	  and	  enacted	  the	  first	   version	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   to	   solve	   the	   public	   goods	   problem	  inherent	  in	  inexhaustible	  goods	  like	  intellectual	  property.3	  Art	  forms	  that	  rely	  primarily	  on	  appropriation	  are	  also	  often	  at	  odds	  with	   the	   current	   copyright	   framework.	   	   For	   example,	   hip-­‐hop	   music	  pioneer	  Public	  Enemy4	  (P.E.)	  incorporated	  hundreds	  of	  recognizable	  and	  
 1. Michalis	   Pilcher,	   Statements	   on	   Appropriation,	   UBUWEB	   (2009),	  http://www.ubu.com/papers/pichler_appropriation.html	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  12,	  2012).	  Pilcher’s	  Statements	  on	  Appropriation	  is	  an	  “appropriation”	  style	  writing	  created	  out	  of	  six	  one	  sentence	  statements	  originated	  by	  the	  "artist/author."	  The	  statements	  were	  mixed,	  in	  a	  container,	  with	  eighteen	   one	   sentence	   quotes	   taken	   from	   various	   other	   sources	   and	   then	   printed	   onto	   a	  separate	  piece	  of	  paper.	  Thereafter,	  eighteen	  statements	  were	  blindly	  and	  randomly	  selected,	  listed	   in	   the	   order	   of	   their	   selection	   and	   presented	   as	   one	   document	   as	   the	   "statements	   on	  appropriation",	  for	  the	  presentation	  at	  Stichting	  Perdu,	  Amsterdam.	  Id.	  2. 	  See	  Pamela	  Samuelson	  et	  al.,	  The	  Copyright	  Principles	  Project,	  25	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	  L.J.	  1176,	   1177	   (2010)	   (“Copyright	   rules	   implicate	   many	   daily	   activities	   of	   ordinary	   people.	  Copyright	  has	  thus	  suddenly	  become	  significant	  not	  only	  to	  industry	  insiders	  who	  are	  steeped	  in	   this	   law's	   complexities,	   but	   also	   to	   the	  millions	   of	   people	  who	   access	   information	   on	   the	  Internet	  and	  who	  often	  share	  this	  information	  with	  others.”).	  3. 	   Copyright	   Act	   of	   1790,	   ch.	   15,	   1,	   1	   Stat.	   124,	   124	   (repealed	   1831).	   	   The	   1790	   Act	  protected	  books,	  maps,	  and	  charts	  and	  provided	  for	  an	  initial	  term	  of	  14	  years	  with	  privilege	  of	  renewal	  for	  a	  term	  of	  14	  years.	  	  4. 	   In	   the	  1980s,	   “Public	  Enemy	  emerged	  and	  distinguished	   itself	   as	  a	   ‘sampling-­‐as-­‐art	  trailblazer’	  by	  incorporating	  hundreds	  of	  samples	  into	  their	  legendary	  1988	  album,	  It	  Takes	  a	  
Nation	  of	  Millions	  to	  Hold	  Us	  Back.	  	  In	  an	  ingenious	  fashion,	  the	  group	  combined	  the	  samples	  in	  a	   unique	  way	   to	   create	   a	   ‘new,	   radical	   sound	   that	   changed	   the	   way	  music	   was	   created	   and	  experienced.’”	   Tonya	   M.	   Evans,	   Sampling,	   Looping	   and	   Mashing	   OH	   MY!	   How	   Hip	   Hop	   is	  
Scratching	  More	  Than	  the	  Surface	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  21	  FORDHAM	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  MEDIA	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  843,	  860	  (2011)	  (citations	  omitted).	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unrecognizable	   aural	   fragments	   into	   each	   of	   their	   songs	   before	   courts	  began	   to	   sanction	   aggressively	   the	   practice	   of	   music	   sampling.5	   	   Their	  status	   as	   a	   trailblazer	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   digital	   sampling	   was	   mostly	   a	  result	   of	   P.E.’s	   “collage”	   style	   of	  music	   creation.6	   	   P.E.	   incorporated	   bits	  and	   bytes7	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   material	   to	   create	   new	   musical	   tracks	   over	  which	   they	   rapped	   about	   political	   and	   social	   issues	   of	   race,	   racism,	  economics,	   violence,	   police	   brutality,	   and	   religion.8	   	   However,	   their	  musical	   collage	   style	   of	   using	   samples	   as	   the	   building	   blocks	   of	   their	  music	   production	   was	   “outlawed”	   as	   an	   infringement.9	   	   That	  determination	   forever	   changed	   the	   production	   of	   hip-­‐hop	  music	   or	   any	  music	   that	   incorporated	   direct	   samples	   of	   copyrighted	   works,	   even	   if	  those	   copies	   and	   adaptations	   were	   used	   for	   some	   arguably	  transformative	  purpose.10	  For	  appropriation	  art	  of	  all	  types	  to	  survive	  an	  infringement	  inquiry,	  the	   resulting	   work	   must	   be	   creative,	   original,	   and	   transformative.	  	  However,	   the	   line	   between	   uses	   deemed	   infringing	   or	   fair	   is	   far	   from	  bright,	  at	   least	   in	  ex-­‐ante	  determinations	  by	  second-­‐generation	  creators	  who	   rely	   on	   copyright	   limitations	   in	   the	   creative	   process.	   	   Accordingly,	  this	   Article	   examines	   the	   role	   that	   “reverse	   engineering”	   and	   other	  policies	  and	  doctrines	  have	  played	  in	  the	  inventive	  context	  to	  protect	  the	  “space”	   such	   second-­‐generation	   innovators	   require	   to	   build	   upon	   and	  around	  existing	  inventions	  that	  justify	  the	  patent	  monopoly.	  	  Further,	  this	  Article	   explores	   how	   patent	   policy	   better	   protects	   and	   encourages	   that	  space	  than	  does	  copyright,	  theoretically	  and	  in	  practice.	  This	  Article	  asserts	  that	  copyright	  reform	  initiatives	  should	  “sample”	  (that	   is,	   borrow	   from)	   patent	   policies	   that	   protect	   access	   for	   further	  innovation	   to	   “remix”	   (that	   is,	   inform	  and	  reform)	  copyright	   law	   for	   the	  
 5. 	  See	  id.	  at	  862.	  6. 	  See	  id.	  7. 	  A	  byte	  is	  “a	  unit	  of	  computer	  information	  or	  data-­‐storage	  capacity	  that	  consists	  of	  a	  group	   of	   eight	   bits	   and	   that	   is	   used	   especially	   to	   represent	   an	   alphanumeric	   character.”	  MERRIAM-­‐WEBSTER	   DICTIONARY,	   available	   at	   http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/dictionary/byte.	  8. 	  See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  862.	  9. 	  See	  Grand	  Upright	  Music,	  Ltd	  v.	  Warner	  Bros.	  Records	  Inc.,	  780	  F.	  Supp.	  182	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1991).	  Grand	  Upright	  is	  the	  landmark	  case	  involving	  rapper	  Biz	  Markie	  who	  sampled	  a	  portion	  of	   the	   music	   from	   Gilbert	   O'Sullivan’s	   song	   “Alone	   Again	   (Naturally)"	   for	   use	   in	   his	   single	  "Alone	  Again.”	  	  See	  also	  Bridgeport	  Music,	  Inc.	  v.	  Dimension	  Films,	  410	  F.3d	  792	  (6th	  Cir.	  2005)	  (finding	  direct	  copying	  of	  a	  sound	  recording	  to	  be	  a	  per	  se	  infringement).	   	  Cf.	  Saregama	  India	  Ltd.	  v.	  Mosley,	  687	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1325	  (S.D.	  Fla.	  2009).	  10. 	  Infra	  Part	  II.	  C.	  3.	  	  See	  Chris	  Richards,	  The	  Court	  Case	  That	  Changed	  Hip-­‐Hop,	  WASH.	  POST	   (July	   6,	   2012),	   http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-­‐court-­‐case-­‐that-­‐changed-­‐hip-­‐hop-­‐-­‐from-­‐public-­‐enemy-­‐to-­‐kanye-­‐-­‐forever/2012/07/06/gJQAVWr0RW_story.html	   (last	  visited	  Aug.	  12,	  2012).	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same	   end	   in	   the	   creative	   context.	   	   Throughout	   the	   Article,	   I	   use	  appropriation	  art	  to	  illustrate	  how	  an	  established	  cumulative	  medium	  of	  artistic	   creation	   is	   negatively	   impacted	   by	   overly	   restrictive	   copyright	  laws	   and	   may	   benefit	   from	   patent	   policies	   seemingly	   better	   suited	   to	  encourage	  and	  support	  such	  creative	  innovation.	  Copyright	   has	   already	   borrowed	   from	   its	   constitutional	   cousin	   in	  creating	  a	  misuse	  doctrine,	   for	  example.11	   	   I	  assert	  other	  patent	  policies	  and	  practices	  are	  ripe	   for	   the	  borrowing.	   	  Patent	  policy,	  despite	   its	  own	  problems	   to	   be	   sure,	   still	   presents	   a	   more	   robust,	   well-­‐defined,	   and	  generally	  more	  efficient	  system	  of	   incentives	   to	  create.12	   	  This	  approach	  both	   empowers	   creators	   to	   access	   and	  make	   use	   of	   existing	   works	   for	  certain	   purposes	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   still	   protects	   rights	   holders	   in	   a	  way	   that	   honors	   the	   constitutional	   directive	   to	   secure	   certain	   exclusive	  rights.	   	   Such	   an	   approach	   is	   particularly	   vital	   for	   traditionally	  collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   creative	   mediums	   that	   produce	   musical,	  dramatic,	   and	   audiovisual	   works.	   	   Accordingly,	   patent	   policy	   should	   be	  “sampled”	  to	  “remix”	  copyright.	  Part	   I	   explores	   the	   problems	   of	   applying	   a	   twentieth	   century	   legal	  framework	  to	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  “creative	  innovation,”	  as	  I	  describe	  it,	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  second-­‐generation	  creative	  output.	  	  In	  this	  Part,	  I	  put	  a	  finer	  point	  on	  the	  general	  observations	  noted	  throughout	  this	  Article	  by	  way	   of	   the	   “appropriation	   art”	   example.	   	   I	   highlight	   the	   different	  outcomes	   an	   appropriation	   artist	   might	   experience	   when	   her	   creative	  effort	  is	  protected	  under	  “patentesque”	  policies	  that	  better	  protect	  use	  of	  existing	   works	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   further	   creation	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  results	  under	  the	  current	  copyright	  framework.	  Part	   II	   of	   this	   Article	   explores	   copyright	   and	   patent	   laws	   as	   distinct	  legal	   regimes.	   	   This	   Part	   addresses	   the	   historical	   underpinnings	   of	  intellectual	   property	   protection	   generally	   and	   how	   both	   regimes	  developed	  as	  mostly	  distinct	  entities	  until	  software	  emerged.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	   copyright,	   I	   also	   address	   the	   impact	   of	   Congressional	   overprotection	  coupled	  with	   the	  additional	  private	   fences	  erected	  by	   rights	  holders	  via	  technological	   and	   contractual	   measures	   to	   further	   extend	   the	   reach	   of	  their	  exclusive	  rights	  beyond	  what	  copyright	  actually	  protects.13	  
 11. For	  a	  discussion	  of	   copyright	  misuse	  and	   its	  origins	   in	   the	  patent	  misuse	  doctrine,	  
see	  infra	  Part	  II.	  12. See	  generally	   John	  Shepard	  Wiley	   Jr.,	  Copyright	  at	   the	  School	  of	  Patent,	  58	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  119,	  120	  (1991)	  (arguing	  that	  copyright	  could	  well	  learn	  from	  patent	  about	  “sensible	  and	  efficient	  incentives”	  because	  such	  a	  focus	  would	  give	  copyright	  the	  coherence	  it	  now	  lacks).	  13. See	  generally	  Nate	  Andersen,	  Can	  I	  Resell	  My	  MP3s?:	  The	  post-­‐sale	  life	  of	  digital	  goods,	  ARS	   TECHNICA	   	   (DEC.	   18,	   2008,	   12:05	   AM),	   http://arstechnica.com/tech-­‐policy/news/2008/12/post-­‐sale-­‐life.ars	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	   17,	   2012);	   Redigi	   Says	   They’ll	   Sell	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Part	   III	  provides	  a	  brief	  history	  of	   the	  role	  of	   reverse-­‐engineering	   in	  the	   inventive	   context	   under	   trade	   secret	   law	   and	   as	   applied	   to	   digital	  goods	  under	  patent,	   copyright,	   and	  a	  hybrid	   regime,	   the	   Semiconductor	  Chip	  Protection	  Act.	   	  Further,	  I	  examine	  briefly	  how	  reverse	  engineering	  is	   used	   in	   the	   video	   game	   industry	   and	   digital	   music	   production	   to	  support	   further	   innovation	   and	   to	   apply	   my	   theoretical	   assertions	   not	  just	   to	   literary	   and	   artistic	   productions,	   but	   to	   the	   process	   of	   creation	  itself.	  	  Finally,	  this	  Part	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  misuse	  in	  both	  the	  copyright	  and	  patent	  contexts	  as	  an	  alternative	  approach	  courts	  have	  used	  to	  limit	  both	  monopolies	  with,	  admittedly,	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success.14	   	   I	  argue	  that	   strong	   recognition	   by	   federal	   judges	   of	   the	   copyright	   misuse	  doctrine,	   would	   better	   protect	   cumulative	   creation	   in	   genres	   like	  appropriation	   art.	   Such	   genres	   benefit	   greatly	   from,	   and	   have	  traditionally	  relied	  on,	   cumulative	  creation	   in	  ways	   that	  generally	  cause	  little,	  if	  any,	  market	  harms	  to	  the	  rights	  holder.	  Finally,	   Part	   IV	   explores	   the	   blurring	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	  copyright	   and	  patent	  protection	   in	   the	  digital	   age.	   	   This	  Part	   challenges	  historic	   notions	   of	   the	   bright-­‐lined	   semantic	   demarcation	   between	   the	  terms	   “innovation”	   (traditionally	   attributed	   to	   patent	   law)	   and	  “creativity”	   (traditionally	   linked	   to	   copyright	   law).15	   	   Because	   computer	  programs	  are	  afforded	  both	  copyright	  and	  patent	  protection,	  for	  example,	  Congress	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   have	   and	   continue	   to	   blur	   the	  distinction	   traditionally	   made	   in	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   both	   regimes.16	  
 
Your	   Used	   MP3s	   Legally,	   HYPEBOT.COM,	   http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2011/02/redigi-­‐says-­‐theyll-­‐sell-­‐your-­‐used-­‐mp3s-­‐legally-­‐.html	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  17,	  2012);	  infra	  Part	  IV.	  14. 	  See	  generally	  Vincent	  Chiappetta,	  Living	  with	  Patents:	  Insights	  from	  Patent	  Misuse,	  15	  MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	  1	  (2011)	  (exploring	  patent	  law’s	  difficulty	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  inherent	  and	  excessive/misuse	  costs	  to	  determine	  when	  patent	  misuse	  is	  supported,	  when	  the	  doctrine	  should	  apply,	  and	  whether	  it	  should	  exist	  at	  all).	  15. 	   But	   see	   Doris	   Estelle	   Long,	   When	   Worlds	   Collide:	   The	   Uneasy	   Convergence	   of	  
Creativity	  and	  Innovation,	  Symposium:	  Information	  Convergence:	  At	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Access,	  25	  J.	  MARSHALL	  J.	  COMPUTER	  &	  INFO.	  L.	  653,	  656	  (2007–08)	  (expressing	  concern	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	   definitional	   distinction	   between	   innovation	   and	   creativity	  wreaks	   havoc	   on	   intellectual	  property	   systems	   that	   should	   remain	   separate	   and	   distinct).	   	   Professor	   Long	   explains	   that	  copyright	   and	  patent	   law	   regimes	  were	   created	   to	   address	  distinct	   legal	   issues	   and	  promote	  distinct	  goals.	   	   She	  also	  notes,	  however,	   the	  point	  asserted	  by	   this	  Author,	   that	  both	   regimes	  share	   a	   common	   bond.	   	   The	   root	   of	   both	   monopolies	   is	   ultimately	   to	   increase	   output	   and	  therefore	   benefit	   society	   by	  making	   life	   better,	   easier,	  more	   productive,	   efficient,	   thoughtful,	  connected	  and	  enjoyable.	  16. 	  In	  1980,	  Congress	  adopted	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  National	  Committee	  on	  New	  Technologies	   Uses	   (CONTU)	   to	  make	   clear	   that	   copyright	   law	   protected	   software	   programs.	  One	  year	   later,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   ruled	   that	   implementation	  of	  a	  mathematical	   formula	   in	  a	  computer	  software	  program	  qualified	  for	  patent	  protection.	  	  See	  Philip	  J.	  Weiser,	  The	  Internet,	  
Innovation,	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	   Policy,	   103	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   534,	   552	   (2003)	   (citations	  omitted).	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Given	  the	  current	  legislative,	  judicial,	  and	  technological	  cross-­‐pollination	  of	   innovation	   and	   creativity	   in	   crafting,	   adjudicating,	   and	   applying	  copyright	   law,	   this	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   trend	   –	   indeed,	   this	   reality	   –	  should	  be	  embraced	  rather	  than	  resisted.	  PART	  I:	  	  SAMPLING	  PATENT	  TO	  REMIX	  COPYRIGHT:	  THEORY	  IN	  PRACTICE	  American	   economist	   Theodore	   Levitt17	   is	  widely	   credited	   for	   saying	  that	   “[c]reativity	   is	   thinking	   up	   new	   things.	   Innovation	   is	   doing	   new	  things.”18	   This	   quotation	   captures	   the	   traditional	   delineation	   between	  copyright	  and	  patent	  protection.	   	  I	  assert,	  however,	  that	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  ways	  of	  “thinking	  and	  doing”	  have	  led	  to	  creative	  innovation	  and	  innovative	   creativity	   in	   the	   face	   of	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   that	  struggle	   to	  hold	  on	   to	  outmoded	  ways	   to	  protect	   those	  productions	  and	  products.	   	   This	   reality	  highlights	   the	  problems	  of	   applying	   an	  outdated,	  limited	  legal	   framework	  to	  current	  technological	  means	  of	   inspiring	  and	  fixing	   creative	   endeavors.	   	   At	   a	  minimum,	   current	   copyright	   protection	  fails	   to	   appreciate	   the	   benefits	   of	   second-­‐generation	   creative	   output	   by	  creators	   who	   are	   first	   users	   of	   existing	   copyrighted	   works.19	   	   Case	   in	  point	   is	   the	   appropriation	   art	   form.	   	   It	   is	   clearly	   established	  within	   art	  history	   and	   culture,	   but	   is	   also	   often	   at	   odds	   with	   copyright	   when	   an	  appropriation	   artist	   copies	   and/or	   adapts	   an	   existing	   copyrighted	  work	  to	   create	   a	   new	   work	   of	   art.	   	   Although	   “appropriation	   art”	   generally	  describes	   the	   post-­‐modern	   art	   practice,	   I	   assert	   the	   term	   contemplates	  any	  art	  form	  that	  relies	  primarily	  on	  the	  use	  of	  “quotation”	  or	  “citation”	  of	  what	   already	   exists	   (whether	   protected	   by	   copyright	   or	   otherwise)	   to	  incorporate	   it	   into	   a	   new	   creative	   work.	   	   This	   includes	   literary	   works,	  video,	  music,	  and,	  of	  course,	  visual	  art.20	  
 17. Ted	   Levitt	   is	   described	   as	   “a	   monumental	   and	   iconoclastic	   figure	   in	   the	   field	   of	  marketing	  and	  former	  editor	  of	  Harvard	  Business	  Review,	  who	  influenced	  generations	  of	  both	  scholars	   and	   practitioners	   with	   his	   groundbreaking,	   always	   provocative,	   and	   often	  controversial	   books	   and	   articles.”	   HARV.	   UNIV.	   GAZETTE,	   Professor	   Theodore	   Levitt,	   legendary	  
marketing	   scholar	   and	   former	   Harvard	   Business	   Review	   editor,	   dead	   at	   81	   (July	   20,	   2006),	  http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/07.20/99-­‐levitt.html.	  18. Mark	  McGuiness,	  The	  Crucial	  Difference	  Between	  Creativity	  and	  Innovation,	  LATERAL	  ACTION	   (Apr.	   20,	   2009),	   http://lateralaction.com/articles/creativity-­‐innovation/	   (last	   visited	  Oct.	  7,	  2012).	  	  19. 	  See	  generally	   JULIE	  E.	  COHEN,	  CONFIGURING	  THE	  NETWORKED	  SELF	  5	  (1st	  ed.	  2012).	   In	  this	   comprehensive	   look	   at	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   users	   and	   creators	   of	   copyright,	   Professor	  Cohen	   rightly	   acknowledges	   the	   failure	  of	   copyright	   law	   to	   fully	   appreciate	   and	   consider	   the	  place	  of	   the	   “user”	   in	   these	   times	  and	  declares	   the	   failure	   to	  be	  a	   “critical	  omission”	   that	   she	  adeptly	   addresses	   in	   the	   text.	   Id.	   [Ch.	   3,	   p.	   5	   of	   electronic	   version	   available	   at	  http://www.juliecohen.com/page9.php	  (last	  visited	  July	  30,	  2012).].	  20. 	  In	  the	  case	  of	  literary	  works,	  the	  role	  of	  quotation	  is	  a	  classic	  form	  of	  appropriation	  in	  scholarly	  writing.	  	  See	  Landes,	  Copyright,	  Borrowed	  Images,	  and	  Appropriation	  Art,	  infra	  note	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For	   example,	   Jeff	   Koons,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   well-­‐known	   living	  appropriation	  artists,	  has	  defended	  his	   fair	  share	  of	   infringement	  claims	  (and	  with	  mixed	  results).	  	  In	  2006,	  Koons	  successfully	  defended	  his	  use	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  photograph	  from	  a	  fashion	  magazine	  in	  his	  collage	  painting	  as	  a	  fair	  use.21	  	  The	  court	  in	  that	  case	  recognized	  the	  “ultimate”	  test	  of	  fair	  use	   as	   “whether	   the	   copyright	   law’s	   goal	   of	   promoting	   the	   progress	   of	  science	  and	  useful	  arts	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  allowing	  the	  use	  than	  by	  preventing	  it.”22	  	  It	  held	  that	  Koons’s	  use	  did	  in	  fact	  promote	  progress	  as	   satirical	   comment	   on	   society’s	   hyper-­‐consumerism,	   that	   he	   used	   a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  the	  original	  work	  for	  that	  purpose,	  and	  that	  his	  use	  was	  “transformative.”23	  However,	  Koons	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  several	  prior	  infringement	  cases	  that	  arose	  from	  an	  art	  exhibition	  entitled,	  “The	  Banality	  Show”	  (Banality).	  	  Banality	   included	   a	   series	   of	   Koons’s	   sculptures,	   which	   incorporated	  reproductions	   of	   images	   taken	   from	   copyrighted	   commercial	   postcards	  and	  syndicated	  comic	  strips.24	  	  In	  the	  Banality	  infringement	  cases,	  Koons	  argued	   that	   despite	   his	   own	   private	   commercial	   gain,	   the	   primary	  purpose	   of	   his	   unauthorized	   use	   was	   social	   comment	   (generally	  expressed	   as	   either	   parody	   or	   satire).25	   	   Comment	   is	   a	   specifically	  enumerated	   fair	   use	   purpose	   and	   character	   of	   use	   under	   section	   107.26	  	  Additionally,	   both	   satire	   and	   parody	   are	   valued	   forms	   of	   criticism,	  although	  they	  are	  analyzed	  differently	  in	  copyright	  infringement	  cases.27	  	  A	  parody	  of	  the	  original	  work	  (that	  is,	  some	  comment	  or	  criticism	  of	  the	  original	  itself)28	  allows	  the	  artist	  to	  appropriate	  more	  of	  the	  original	  than	  would	  satire,	  which	  is	  a	  comment	  on	  society	  or	  some	  societal	  ill.29	  
 46,	  at	  20.	  This	  Article,	  of	  course,	  serves	  as	  case-­‐in-­‐point.	  21. 	  Blanch	  v.	  Koons,	  467	  F.3d	  244	  (2d	  Cir.	  2006).	  22. 	  Id.	  at	  251	  (citing	  Castle	  Rock	  Entm’t,	  Inc.	  v.	  Carol	  Pub.	  Grp.,	  Inc.,	  150	  F.3d	  132,	  141	  (2d	  Cir.	  1998)).	  23. 	  Id.	  24. 	  See	  Blanch,	   467	  F.3d	  at	  246	   (citing	  Rogers	  v.	  Koons,	   960	  F.2d	  301	   (2d	  Cir.	   1992),	  
cert.	  denied,	  506	  U.S.	  934,	  113	  S.	  Ct.	  365,	  121	  L.	  Ed.	  2d	  278	  (1992);	  Campbell	  v.	  Koons,	  No.	  91	  Civ.	  6055,	  1993	  WL	  97381,	  1993	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  3957	  (S.D.N.Y.	  Apr.	  1,	  1993);	  United	  Feature	  Syndicate	  v.	  Koons,	  817	  F.	  Supp.	  370	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1993)).	  25. 	   Although	   parody	   and	   satire	   are	   both	   forms	   of	   comments	   and	   criticism	   they	   are	  treated	  quite	  differently	  in	  the	  copyright	  context.	  	  26. 	  Rogers	  v.	  Koons,	  960	  F.2d	  at	  309.	  27. 	   Id.	   at	  310	  (citing	  Warner	  Bros.	   Inc.	  v.	  Am.	  Broad.	  Cos.,	   Inc.,	  720	  F.2d	  231,	  242	  (2d	  Cir.1983)	   (noting	   that	   parody	   and	   satire	   are	   encouraged	   because,	   through	   comment	   and	  critique,	  they	  both	  “foster	  the	  creativity	  protected	  by	  the	  copyright	  law”).	  28. 	  A	  good	  example	  is	  Alice	  Randall’s	  literary	  work	  “The	  Wind	  Done	  Gone”,	  a	  parody	  of	  Margaret	  Mitchell’s	  “Gone	  with	  the	  Wind.”	  See	  Suntrust	  Bank	  v.	  Houghton	  Mifflin	  Co.,	  268	  F.3d	  1257	  (11th	  Cir.	  2001).	  29. 	  See	  Koons,	  960	  F.2d	  at	  310.	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But	  because	  Koons	  argued	  his	  use	  was	  parodic,	  the	  court	  had	  to	  focus	  on	  parody	  and	  analyze	  whether	  Koons’s	  “String	  of	  Puppies”	  was	  properly	  considered	  a	  parodic	  comment	  on	  or	  a	  criticism	  of	  the	  Rogers	  photograph	  “Puppies.”	   	   The	   court	   held	   it	   was	   not.	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   substantial	  similarity	  of	   the	   two	  works	  without	   sufficient	   legal	   justification	   led	   to	  a	  finding	  of	  infringement.30	  Appropriation	   art	   is	   based,	   as	   the	   name	   suggests,	   on	   incorporating	  existing	   materials	   into	   a	   new	   resulting	   work.31	   	   Appropriation	   artists	  often	  use	  recognizable	  elements	  from	  society	  and	  from	  other	  artists	  as	  a	  form	  of	  comment	  or	  criticism.	  	  The	  practice	  embraces	  “the	  maxim	  touted	  by	   modernist	   artists	   who	   question	   the	   nature	   or	   meaning	   of	   art”	   by	  intentionally	   blurring	   and	   indeed	   crossing	   the	   lines	   of	   “originality,	  creation,	   and	   authenticity.”32	   	   Many	   consider	   Marcel	   Duchamp	   the	  Conceptual	  Godfather	  of	  appropriation	  art.33	  	  His	  “readymade”	  works	  re-­‐contextualized	   everyday	   items	   found	   in	   the	   home	   and	   in	   everyday	   life.	  	  The	   most	   notable	   of	   these	   was	   his	   infamous	   work	   titled	   Fountain,	   an	  actual	  urinal	  signed	  with	  the	  pseudonym	  “R.	  Mutt”	  and	  submitted	  to	  (and	  rejected	  by)	  the	  Society	  of	  Independent	  Artists	  exhibition.	   	  Interestingly,	  
Fountain	  was	  selected	  in	  2004	  by	  five	  hundred	  art	  experts	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  as	   the	  most	   influential	  work	  of	  modern	  art	  ahead	  of	  works	  by	  Picasso	  and	  Matisse.34	  Examples	  of	  appropriation	  art	   in	   the	  visual	  context	   include	  a	  collage	  that	   incorporates	   any	   of	   the	   following	   into	   a	   new	   work:	   1)	   a	   public	  domain	  work	  or	  other	  unprotected	  preexisting	  material;	  2)	  a	  copyrighted	  work;	   or	   3)	   both	   unprotected	   and	   copyrighted	   works.35	   	   The	   resulting	  work	   can	   be	   one	   unique	   work	   or	   mass-­‐produced	   into	   multiple	   copies.	  Appropriation	  art	   that	  borrows	  from	  copyrighted	  works	  risks	   infringing	  upon	   the	   original	   if	   any	   of	   the	   section	   106	   rights	   is	   involved.36	   	   So	   the	  
 30. Id.	  at	  306	  (upholding	  the	  district	  court	  finding	  of	  infringement).	  31. See	  Eric	  D.	  Gorman,	  Appropriate	  Testing	  and	  Resolution:	  How	  to	  Determine	  Whether	  
Appropriation	   Art	   is	   Transformative	   “Fair	   Use”	   or	  Merely	   an	   Unauthorized	   Derivative?,	   43	   ST.	  MARY’S	  L.J.	  289,	  291	  (2012).	  “The	  term	  ‘appropriation	  art’	  essentially	  involves	  the	  taking	  of	  an	  image	   garnered	   from	   a	   real	   object	   or	   even	   an	   existing	  work	   of	   art	   and	   using	   the	   borrowed	  elements	  to	  form	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  art.”	  Id.	  (citations	  omitted).	  	  32. See	  id.	  at	  292.	  33. See	   Appropriations,	   REMIXTHEBOOK,	   http://www.remixthebook.com/the-­‐course/appropriation	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  	  DuChamp	  (1887–1968)	  was	  a	  very	  influential	  twentieth	   century	   French-­‐born	   artist	  whose	  work	   is	  most	   often	   associated	  with	   the	   Dadaist	  and	  Surrealist	  movements.	  	  34. See	   Duchamp’s	   Urinal	   Tops	   Art	   Survey,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (DEC.	   1,	   2004,	   5:56	   PM),	  	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4059997.stm	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  35. See	  Landes,	  infra	  note	  46,	  at	  12–16.	  36. But	  see	  Lee	  v.	  A.R.T.	  Co.,	  125	  F.3d	  580	  (7th	  Cir.	  1997)	  (involving	  original	  copyrighted	  works	  were,	  after	  a	  lawful	  first	  sale,	  mounted	  on	  tiles	  and	  sold).	  Mounting	  the	  original	  was	  held	  
2013]	   REVERSE	  ENGINEERING	  IP	   69	  
	  
question	  is,	  whether	  appropriation	  art	  is	  in	  essence	  an	  infringement	  or	  a	  productive	  use	  deemed	  fair,	  de	  minimis,	  or	  altogether	  new.37	  	  The	  answer	  is	  a	  lawyerly	  one:	  it	  depends.38	  Jeff	  Koons	  (as	  noted	  above)	  and	  the	  late	  Andy	  Warhol	  remain	  iconic	  in	  their	   prominent	   positions	   as	   appropriation	   artists	   in	   the	   world	   of	  contemporary	  art	  and	  culture.39	  	  Some	  modern-­‐day	  appropriation	  artists	  include	  photographers	  Sherrie	  Levine	  (known	  for	  taking	  photographs	  of	  existing	  photographs);	  Cindy	  Sherman	   (who	  works	  on	  both	   sides	  of	   the	  camera	  and	  incorporates	  doll	  parts	  or	  prosthetic	  body	  parts	  arranged	  in	  scenes	  with	   intentionally	  vile	  substances	   in	  her	  photographs);40	  Damien	  Hirst	   (a	   widely	   acclaimed	   English	   artist	   noted	   for	   use	   of	   preserved	  animals	  in	  display	  cases	  to	  comment	  on	  death	  and	  the	  fragility	  of	   life);41	  and	   painter	   Deborah	   Kass	   (who	   uses	   Andy	   Warhol	   as	   inspiration	   to	  comment	  in	  her	  work	  on	  the	  intersection	  of	  pop	  culture,	  art	  history,	  and	  the	  self).42	  	  The	  impact	  on	  art	  and	  culture	  of	  these	  artists,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  demand,	  acclaim,	  and	  disdain	  for	  their	  work,	  suggests	  appropriation	  art	  has	  been	  and	   remains	   an	   important	   and	   vital	   art	   form,	   and	   certainly	   of	   the	   type	  that	   promotes	   cultural	   progress.	   	   The	   tradition	   continues	   through	   the	  work	  of	  digital	  appropriation	  artists	  like	  Cory	  Arcangel,	  who	  appropriates	  imagery	   from	  computer	  games,	  video,	  music,	   sculpture,	  print,	  and	  other	  mediums	  into	  new	  works	  to	  explore	  the	  connection	  between	  technology	  and	   culture.43	   	   Arcangel’s	   work	   is	   in	   the	   permanent	   collections	   of	   the	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  the	  Smithsonian,	  and	  the	  Tate.44	  
 to	  be	  a	  non-­‐infringing	  use	  of	  a	  lawful	  copy.	  37. In	   addition,	   an	   appropriation	   artist	   can	   also	   run	   afoul	   of	   the	   Digital	   Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  if	  she	  seeks	  to	  work	  around	  encryption	  fences	  to	  access	  the	  underlying	  elements.	  38. See	  Gorman,	  supra	  note	  31,	  at	  294	  (noting	  that	  the	  fair	  use	  defense	  can	  help	  counter	  infringement	  allegations).	  39. For	   biographical	   information	   about	   Jeff	   Koons	   see	   WIKIPEDIA,	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Koons	   (last	   visited	   Aug.	   6,	   2012).	   	   For	   biographical	  information	   about	   Andy	   Warhol	   see	   WARHOLFOUNDATION,	  http://www.warholfoundation.org/legacy/biography.html	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  40. See	   CINDYSHERMAN.COM,	   http://www.cindysherman.com/biography.shtml	   (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  41. See	   DAMIENHIRST.COM,	   http://www.damienhirst.com/biography/read-­‐more-­‐about-­‐the-­‐artist	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  42. See	   WIKIPEDIA,	   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deborah_Kass	   (last	   visited	   Aug.	   6,	  2012).	  43. See	   Cory	   Arcangel:	   Pro	   Tools,	   WHITNEY.ORG,	  http://whitney.org/Exhibitions/CoryArcangel/	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	  	  44. See	   Andrea	   K.	   Scott,	   Futurism,	   THE	   NEW	   YORKER	   (May	   30,	   2011),	  http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/30/110530fa_fact_scott#ixzz22pr0wWQM	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  6,	  2012).	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The	   greatest	   repository	   of	   appropriation	   art,	   however,	   is	   not	   in	   the	  hallowed	  halls	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  famous	  art	  galleries	  and	  museums;	   it	  is	  on	  YouTube.45	  	  YouTube	  and	  similar	  sites	  are	  the	  fertile	  digital	  ground	  into	   which	   millions	   of	   unknown	   appropriation	   artists	   (who	   sometimes	  actually	  become	  well-­‐known	  if	  their	  video	  “goes	  viral”)	  plant	  their	  mixed-­‐down	  and	  mashed-­‐up	  creations	  for	  all	  of	   the	  the	  world	  (or	  at	   least	  their	  “world”	  of	  friends	  and	  family)	  to	  watch	  and	  share.	  Traditionally,	   appropriation	   art	   refers	   to	   visual	   works	   that	   borrow	  images	  and	  objects	  from	  popular	  culture	  and	  mass	  media,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  other	   copyrighted	   works.46	   	   This	   latter	   point	   is	   what	   often	   leads	  appropriation	   art	   to	   be	   at	   odds	  with	   copyright	   law	   and	   scrutinized	   for	  infringement.47	   	   Because	   successful	   appropriation	   artists	   change	   the	  context	  of	  the	  appropriated	  materials	  into	  something	  new	  that	  is	  creative	  beyond	   what	   already	   exists,	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   appropriation	   is	  sufficiently	   transformative	   to	  be	  deemed	  something	  entirely	  new	  rather	  than	  a	  mere	  market-­‐substitution	  or	  unauthorized	  derivative.48	  	  More	  than	  merely	   engaging	   in	   private	   consumption	   of	   protected	   works,	  appropriation	   artists	   are	   authors	   themselves.	   	   They	   are	  what	   Professor	  Julie	   E.	   Cohen	   refers	   to	   as	   a	   “romantic	   user.”49	   	   Professor	   Cohen	   posits	  that	  the	  “romantic	  user”	  (a	  play	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Romantic	  author	  as	  discussed	   herein)	   is	   a	   “dedicated	   and	   perceptive	   cultural	   critic”	   who	  transforms	   existing	  works	   into	   new	   creative	   productions	   as	   a	  means	   of	  expression	   and	   therefore	   engages	   in	   the	   types	   of	   productive	   and	  preferred	  uses	  most	  aligned	  with	  the	  policy	  of	  cultural	  progress.	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   result	   under	   the	   current	   copyright	   regime,	   an	  appropriation	  artist	  could	  enjoy	  a	  different	  outcome	  that	  a	  second-­‐comer	  might	   experience	   in	   the	   digital	   realm	   when	   her	   creative	   effort	   is	  protected	   under	   a	   framework	   that	   incorporates	   “patentesque”	   policies	  with	   copyright	   law.	   	   Such	   a	   hybrid	   framework–perhaps	   akin	   to	   the	  Semiconductor	   Chip	   Protection	   Act	   (SCPA)–would	   privilege	   access	   to	   a	  greater	   range	   of	   protected	   works	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   encouraging	  production	  of	  new	  creative	  works	   through	  collaborative	  and	  cumulative	  art	  forms	  like	  appropriation	  art.	  
 45. See	   James	  Plotkin,	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  Appropriation	  Art:	  Part	   I,	  BLOGSPOT.COM	  (May	  14,	   2001),	   http://jamesplotkin.blogspot.com/2011/05/copyright-­‐law-­‐and-­‐apropriation-­‐art-­‐part.html.	  46. See	   William	   M.	   Landes,	   Copyright,	   Borrowed	   Images,	   and	   Appropriation	   Art:	   An	  
Economic	   Approach,	   9	   GEO.	   MASON	   L.	   REV.	   1,	   1	   (2000)	   (examining	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	  economics	  the	  relationship	  between	  copyright	  law,	  borrowed	  images	  and	  appropriation	  art).	  47. See	  id.	  48. Id.	  49. See	  Cohen,	  supra	  note	  19.	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If	   a	   fundamental	   goal	   of	   the	   copyright	   monopoly	   is	   to	   promote	  economic	   efficiency	   as	   a	   means	   to	   encourage	   the	   creation	   and	  dissemination	   of	   cultural	   productions,	   traditional	   appropriation	   art	  seems	   aligned	   with	   that	   goal.	   	   Copyright—at	   least	   before	   the	   DMCA’s	  access	  limitations—already	  provides	  adequate	  and	  economically	  efficient	  means	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  and	  balance	  interests.50	  	  But	  appropriation	  art	  forms	  in	  the	  digital	  context,	  however,	  do	  not	  always	  seem	  to	  fare	  as	  well,	  especially	   in	   light	   of	   the	   DMCA,	   which	   is	   referred	   to	   by	   some	  commentators	   as	   “paracopyright.”51	   	   For	   example,	   when	   a	   copyright	  owner	   conditions	   access	   to	   non-­‐copyright	   protected	   aspects	   of	   an	  otherwise	  protected	  work	  or	  prohibits	  fair	  uses	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  access,	  such	  may	  be	  deemed	  an	  abuse	  of	  not	  only	  the	  copyright,	  but	  the	  ancillary	  prohibitions	  of	  decryption.	  	  Therefore,	  non-­‐protectable	  elements	  may	  be	  encrypted,	  and	  cracking	  the	  encryption	  code	  to	  gain	  access	  and	  engage	  in	  otherwise	   permissible	   copying	   and	   adaptation	   is	   unlawful	   under	   the	  DMCA,	   unless	   some	   legal	   space	   for	   such	   activities	   is	   protected.	   	   I	   argue	  permitting	  reverse	  engineering	  in	  some	  form	  or	  fashion	  can	  preserve	  this	  space.52	  Accordingly,	   appropriation	   art	   forms	   would	   clearly	   benefit	   from	   a	  legal	   framework	  more	   permissive	   of	   such	   innovative	   artistic	   uses	   or	   at	  least	   a	   strong	   judicial	   recognition	   of	   the	  misuse	   doctrine	   to	   protect	   the	  culturally	  productive	  uses	  likely	  deemed	  fair	  or	  de	  minimis.	  PART	  II:	  	  THE	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  MONOPOLIES53	  Twentieth	   century	   technological	   advancements,	   like	   the	   piano	   roll,	  radio,	   television,	   cable	   and	   satellite,	   the	   VCR,	   and	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  networks,54	  may	  well	  have	  tested	  the	  outer	  bounds	  of	  copyright	  law	  and	  
 50. See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  2–3.	  51. See	   generally	   Dan	   L.	   Burk,	  Anticircumvention	  Misuse,	   50	  UCLA	  L.	   REV.	   1095	   (2002)	  (arguing	   that	   DMCA	   “paracopyright”	   provisions	   are	   easily	   abused	   and	   therefore	   a	   strong	  recognition	   by	   courts	   of	   anti-­‐circumvention	   misuse	   is	   needed	   to	   curtail	   such	   abuses	  sufficiently);	  Michael	  J.	  Remington,	  The	  Ever-­‐whirling	  Cycle	  of	  Change:	  Copyright	  and	  Cyberspace	  	  3	   N.C.	   J.L.	   &	   TECH.	   213,	   238–41	   (2001–02)	   (citing	   David	   Nimmer,	   Puzzles	   of	   the	   Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act,	  46	  J.	  COPYRIGHT	  SOC’Y	  U.S.A.	  401,	  405	  (1999)).	  	  	  52. See	  Dan	  L.	  Burk,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  1132.	  53. The	  term	  intellectual	  property	  primarily	  encompasses	  copyright,	  patent,	  trademark,	  trade	   secret	   and	   right	  of	  publicity.	   	  The	   term	  was	   coined	  by	  Kohler	   and	  Picard	  because	   they	  believed	   copyright,	   patent,	   and	   trademark	   in	   particular	   shared	   certain	   commonalities	   not	  shared	  with	  tangible	  property.	  See	  J.H.	  Reichman,	  Charting	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Patent-­‐Copyright	  
Dichotomy:	  Premises	   for	  a	  Restructured	  International	   Intellectual	  Property	  System,	  13	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  475,	  507–08	  (1994–95).	  54. Interestingly,	  the	  Internet	  as	  originally	  conceived	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  a/k/a	  ARPANET,	  was	   a	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   system	   operated	   and	   maintained	   by	   the	   United	   States	   government.	   See	  
generally	   Nelson	   Minar	   and	   Marc	   Hedlund,	   Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer:	   Harnessing	   the	   Power	   of	   Disruptive	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struck	   fear	   in	   the	   hearts	   (and	  wallets)	   of	   corporate	   rights	   holders	   that	  such	   technologies	   would	   decimate	   the	   information,	   software,	   and	  entertainment	   industries	   they	   involved.	   	   But	   no	   technological	   advances	  have	   challenged	   copyright	   law	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   and	   invoked	   such	  concern	   among	   IP-­‐intensive	   product	   rights	   holders	   than	   digital	  technology	  and	  the	  Internet	  in	  their	  current	  forms.	  What	   began	   as	   a	   computer	   networking	   concept	   involving	   packet	  switching	  in	  the	  1960s55	  and	  grew	  to	  DOS-­‐driven	  green	  screens,	  message	  boards,	   and	   chat	   rooms	   has	   morphed	   into	   a	   significant	   force	   that	   has	  forever	   altered	   the	   way	   we	   communicate,	   work,	   play,	   shop,	   learn,	  consume,	   collaborate,	   and	   connect	   regardless	   of	   our	   geographic	  location.56	   	   Without	   question,	   digital	   technology	   has	   changed	   how	   and	  
what	   we	   produce.	   	   It	   has	   also	   changed	   the	  ways	   and	   reasons	   inventive	  and	   creative	   goods—especially	   creative	   digital	   goods—are	   protected	  legally	  via	  the	  primary	  traditional	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  of	  patent	  and	   copyright.	   	   And	   until	   relatively	   recently	   in	   the	   history	   of	   IP,	   those	  regimes	  were	  clearly	  and	  intentionally	  segregated.57	  
A.	  	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Regimes	  Copyright	  and	  patent	  had	  very	  different	  histories	  prior	  to	  ratification	  of	   the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  and	   the	   first	   enactments	  of	   the	  United	  States	   Copyright	   and	   Patent	   Acts	   in	   1790.58	   	   The	   copyright	   and	   patent	  monopolies	   were	   both	   born	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution	   and	   granted	   to	  authors	  and	  inventors	  certain	  exclusive	  rights	  for	  limited	  times.59	  	  These	  monopolies	  were	   created	   and	   included	   in	   the	   Constitution	   in	   a	   time	   of	  great	   caution	   and	   skepticism	   of	   monopolistic	   activities	   in	   the	   public	  
 
Technologies,	   O’REILLY.COM	   (Mar.	   2001),	   available	   at	  http://oreilly.com/catalog/peertopeer/chapter/ch01.html.	  55. See	   INTERNET	   SOC’Y,	   A	   Brief	   History	   of	   the	   Internet,	  http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  28,	  2012).	  56. Id.	   (noting:	   “[t]he	   Internet	   is	   at	   once	   a	   world-­‐wide	   broadcasting	   capability,	   a	  mechanism	   for	   information	   dissemination,	   and	   a	   medium	   for	   collaboration	   and	   interaction	  between	  individuals	  and	  their	  computers	  without	  regard	  for	  geographic	  location.”).	  	  57. See	  infra	  Part	  IV.	  58. See	   Gregory	   N.	   Mandel,	   Left-­‐Brain	   Versus	   Right-­‐Brain:	   Competing	   Conceptions	   of	  
Creativity	   in	   Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  44	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  283,	  288	  (2010)	  (noting	   that	   “the	  explanatory	   model	   of	   how	   intellectual	   property	   developed	   .	   .	   .	   relies	   on	   these	   histories	   as	  significantly	  determinative.”).	  	  After	  achieving	  independence	  in	  the	  days	  of	  the	  confederacy	  and	  in	   the	   days	   prior	   to	   adoption	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution,	   most	   of	   states	   maintained	   their	   own	  patent	   laws.	   	   South	  Carolina,	   however,	  was	   the	   only	   state	   to	   expressly	   grant	   to	   inventors	   an	  exclusive	  privilege	  of	  using	  their	  new	  machines	  for	  a	  defined	  period	  (14	  years).	  	  See	  generally	  A	  
Brief	   History	   of	   the	   Patent	   Law	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   LADAS	   &	   PARRY	   LLP,	  http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  19,	  2012).	  59. U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  8.	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sphere.60	   They	   were	   designed	   and	   maintained	   for	   centuries	   as	   distinct	  legal	  regimes	  with	  different	  subject	  matter.61	   	  The	  dividing	  line	  between	  the	  two	  remained	  bright	  until	  the	  technological	  advance	  of	  software	  and	  digital	   technology	   led	   to,	   albeit,	   controversial	   protection	   under	   both	  regimes.62	  Both	   were	   legislatively	   prescribed	   antidotes	   intended	   to	   cure	   the	  public-­‐goods	  problem	  that	  plagued	  intangible	  and	  inexhaustible	  products	  in	   a	   way	   not	   usually	   suffered	   in	   the	   tangible	   goods	   market.63	   	   Unlike	  tangible	   goods	   that	   enjoyed	   comparative	   success	   among	   standardized	  goods	   because	   of	   some	   combination	   of	   quality,	   customer	   service,	   and	  price,64	   the	   value	   of	   intellectual	   property	   came	   from	   novelty	   or	  originality.65	   	   The	   concern	   was	   that	   such	   products	   would,	   absent	   legal	  protection,	  be	  co-­‐opted	  by	  those	  free-­‐riders	  who	  had	  not	  invested	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  costs	  of	  initial	  production.66	  Each	  monopoly	   rested	   on	   distinguishable	   policy	   goals	   to	   incentivize	  different	  classes	  of	  resulting	  works.	  	  Copyright	  focused	  on	  original	  artistic	  productions	   and	   patent	   was	   concerned	   with	   novel,	   nonobvious,	   and	  useful	   inventive	   products.	   	   The	   laws,	   both	   domestically	   and	  
 60. See	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  486.	  61. See	  generally,	   John	  Shepard	  Wiley,	  Jr.	  Copyright	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Patent,	  58	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	   119,	   119	   (1991)	   (explaining	   that	   the	   two	   are	   separate	   doctrines	   and	   have	   distinct	  procedures	  because	  of	  the	  different	  resulting	  works	  that	  each	  protects).	  62. See	  generally	  Julie	  E.	  Cohen	  and	  Mark	  A.	  Lemley,	  Patent	  Scope	  and	  Innovation	  in	  the	  
Software	   Industry,	   89	  CAL.	   L.	  REV.	  1,	  3	   (2001).	   (noting	   that	  despite	   the	  great	  deal	  of	   attention	  paid	  in	  academic	  literature	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  software	  should	  be	  patentable	  subject-­‐matter,	  that	  question	  is	  for	  the	  “history	  books”	  as	  a	  foregone	  conclusion);	  Lateef	  Mtima,	  So	  Dark	  
the	  CON(TU)	  of	  Man:	  The	  Quest	  for	  a	  Software	  Derivative	  Work	  Right	  in	  Section	  117,	  69	  U.	  PITT.	  L.	  REV.	   23	   (2007–08)	   (noting	   that	   “[u]nlike	   the	   artistic	   works	   traditionally	   protected	   by	   the	  copyright	  law,	  such	  as	  novels	  and	  songs,	  software	  programs	  are	  primarily	  utilitarian	  in	  nature,	  meaning	  that	  the	  salient	  purpose	  of	  a	  software	  program	  is	  to	  undertake	  a	  task	  as	  opposed	  to	  expressing	  aesthetic	  ideas	  [and	  that	  therefore]	  the	  social	  policy	  goals	  of	  the	  copyright	  law-­‐the	  stimulation	   of	   aesthetic	   interpretation,	   expression,	   and	   cultural	   advancement	   and	  enlightenment-­‐are	  not	  immediately	  compatible	  with	  the	  utilitarian	  nature	  of	  and	  concomitant	  benefits	  presented	  by	  computer	  software	  programs.”).	  	  63. 	   David	   S.	   Olson,	  Taking	   the	   Utilitarian	   Basis	   for	   Patent	   Law	   Seriously:	   The	   Case	   for	  
Restricting	  Patentable	  Subject	  Matter,	  82	  TEMP.	  L.	  REV.	  181,	  191–92;	  196–97	  (2009)	  (explaining	  how	  the	  patent	  regime	  solves	  the	  public	  goods	  problem	  by	  granting	  patentees	  monopoly	  rights,	  currently	  for	  20	  years).	  64. 	   The	   saying	   in	   business:	   “Price,	   quality,	   service.	   	   Choose	   two.”	   has	   become	   all	   but	  axiomatic	  in	  marketing	  circles.	  65. 	  See	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  476.	  	  66. 	  See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  5.	  	  Note,	  however,	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  unique	  goods	  (like	  a	  painting,	  for	  example),	  the	  argument	  for	  protection	  may	  be	  weaker	  given	  that	  the	  value	  in	  the	  original	  copy	  comes	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  work	  itself	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  reproductions.	  	  
Id.	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internationally,	   were	   historically	   distinguishable	   as	   well.67	   	   Section	  102(b)	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act,	   for	   example,	   served	   the	   dual	   purpose	   of	  identifying	   both	   protectable	   and	   non-­‐protectable	   subject-­‐matter	   and	  channeling	   and	   separating	   creative	   (copyrightable)	   from	   innovative	  (patentable)	   endeavors.68	   	   The	   reason	   these	   two	   regimes	  were	   tracked	  separately	   is	   because	   patent	   and	   copyright	   offered	   distinct	   types	   of	  protection	   and	   for	   different	   reasons.	   	   Therefore,	   without	   clear	  boundaries,	   savvy	   entrepreneurs	   would	   circumvent	   the	   more	   arduous	  patent	   system	   and	   secure	   patent-­‐like	   protection	   via	   the	   less	   rigorous	  copyright	  system.69	  	  However,	  and	  as	  discussed	  in	  Part	  IV	  more	  fully,	  this	  concern	  seems	  already	  to	  have	  come	  to	  pass.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  art	  versus	  utility	  distinction	   has	   collapsed	   in	   on	   itself	   to	   the	   point	   of	   becoming	  discredited.70	  The	  patent	  and	  copyright	  monopolies	  were	   created	  as	  exceptions	   to	  an	   otherwise	   liberal	   economic	   system	   that	   values	   fair	   competition	  without	   government	   interference.71	   	   Under	   patent	   law,	   there	   is	   an	  underlying	  rush	  to	  market	  for	  useful,	  efficient	  products	  that	  improve	  our	  lives,	   which	   is	   supported	   by	   fair	   competition.	   	   In	   contrast,	   there	   is	  generally	   no	   corresponding	   urgency	   to	   get	   copyrighted	   productions	   to	  market,	  at	  least	  not	  purely	  artistic	  ones	  like	  paintings	  or	  sculptures.	  	  This	  latter	   point	   is	   evidenced	   to	   some	   degree	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   rather	   than	  assessing	   value	   of	   creative	   productions	   before	   protection	   is	   granted,	  copyright	  law	  protects	  equally	  all	  creative	  works	  automatically	  once	  fixed	  in	   a	   tangible	  medium	   of	   expression.	   	   Valuation,	   therefore,	   is	   left	   to	   the	  market	  to	  determine	  the	  short	  and	  long	  term	  economic	  and	  artistic	  value	  of	  a	  work.72	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  copyright	  and	  patent	  monopolies	  developed	  as	   separate	   and	   distinct	   regimes.	   	   They	   protected	   different	   productions	  and	   were	   supported	   and	   guided	   by	   distinguishable	   policies	   and	   goals.	  	  
 67. 	  See	  J.H.	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  477–79	  (1995)	  (comparing	  and	  contrasting	  the	  “bipolar	  framework”	  of	  international	  intellectual	  property	  law	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Paris	  and	  Berne	  Conventions	   a.k.a.	   the	   “Great	   Conventions”	   with	   the	   “universal	   minimum	   standards”	   that	  sought	  to	  harmonize	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  the	  distinct	  IP	  regimes	  in	  light	  of	  TRIPS).	  	  68. 	   For	   example,	   section	  102(b)	   excludes	  procedures,	   processes,	   systems,	  methods	  of	  operation	   and	   discoveries	   regardless	   of	   form	   or	   embodiment	   from	   copyrightable	   subject	  matter.	  All	  of	  those	  listed	  are	  considered	  patentable	  subject	  matter,	  however.	  	  See	  H.R.	  REP	  No.	  94–1476,	   94th	   Cong.,	   2d	   Sess.	   57	   (1976)	   (legislative	   history	   of	   102(b)).	   	   See	   also	   Pamela	  Samuelson,	  Why	  Copyright	  Excludes	  Systems	  and	  Processes	   from	  the	  Scope	  of	   Its	  Protection,	  85	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1921,	  1926	  (2007).	  69. See	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  482.	  70. See	  id.	  (citing	  Mazer	  v.	  Stein,	  347	  U.S.	  201	  (1954)).	  71. See	  id.	  at	  485	  (noting	  that	  both	  regimes	  rest	  on	  an	  underlying	  assumption,	  actual	  or	  theoretical,	   that	   economic	   incentives	   are	   necessary	   to	   spur	   competition	   and	   encourage	  innovation	  novel	  products	  and	  original	  productions).	  72. See	  id.	  at	  493.	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The	   divergent	   paths,	   however,	   converged	   in	   irreversible	   and	   important	  ways	  due	  to	  digital	  technology.	  
B.	  	  Patent	  1.	  	  Policy	  Considerations	  and	  the	  Law	  Patent	  law	  is	  a	  complex	  system	  of	  rights,	  benefits,	  and	  costs	  organized	  to	  encourage	   innovation	  and	  competition.73	   	  Patent	   law	  achieves	   this,	   in	  theory,	   by	   providing	   a	   number	   of	   incentives.	   	   The	   exact	   number	   and	  relative	   importance	   is	   a	   subject	   of	   on-­‐going	   debate.	   Scholars	   generally	  agree,	  however,	  on	  the	  incentives	  to	  invent,	  to	  disclose,	  to	  build	  upon	  and	  improve,	   and	   to	   exploit	   commercially.74	   	   The	   goal	   of	   improvement	   is	   of	  particular	  import	  in	  the	  patent	  law	  context.	  Under	  the	  current	  version	  of	  the	  Patent	  Act,75	  a	  patent	  applicant	  may	  obtain	   a	   patent	   if	   her	   invention	   is	   a	   useful,	   novel,	   and	   non-­‐obvious	  process,	   machine,	   manufacture,	   or	   composition	   of	   matter.76	   	   The	   right	  conferred	  by	  the	  patent	  grant	  is,	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  statute	  and	  of	  the	  grant	   itself,	   “the	  right	   to	  exclude	  others	   from	  making,	  using,	  offering	   for	  sale,	   or	   selling”	   the	   invention	   in	   the	   United	   States	   or	   “importing”	   the	  invention	   into	   the	   United	   States.77	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   patent	   monopoly	  confers	  a	  negative	  right—the	  right	  to	  exclude.	  The	  Patent	  Clause	  balances	  the	  need	  to	  encourage	  innovation	  with	  the	  need	   to	   avoid	   monopolies,	   which	   stifle	   competition	   without	   any	  corresponding	   advancement	   in	   the	   “Progress	   of	   Science	   and	   useful	  Arts.”78	  	  Thus,	  from	  its	  inception,	  patent	  law	  “embodied	  a	  careful	  balance	  between	   the	   need	   to	   promote	   innovation	   and	   the	   recognition	   that	  imitation	   and	   refinement	   through	   imitation	   are	   both	   necessary	   to	  invention	  itself	  and	  the	  very	  lifeblood	  of	  a	  competitive	  economy.”79	  
 73. Lee	  Petherbridge,	  On	  The	  Development	  of	  Patent	  Law,	   43	  LOY.	   L.A.	   L.	  REV.	   893,	  898	  (2010).	  74. See	  id.	  at	  899.	  75. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101	  et	  seq.	  76. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101,	  §	  102(a)	  and	  §	  103.	  Patentable	  subject-­‐matter	  was	  originally	  defined	  in	  the	  Patent	  Act	  of	  1793	  as	  “any	  new	  and	  useful	  art,	  machine,	  manufacture,	  or	  composition	  of	  matter	   	  .	  .	  .	  .”	   	   Diamond	   v.	   Chakrabarty,	   447	   U.S.	   303,	   308	   (1980).	   	   The	   Framers	   conceived	  “useful	  art”	  to	  be	  mechanical	   inventions	  useful	  for	  farmers.	   	  See	  Burk,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  1159.	  	  “Art”	  was	  later	  replaced	  by	  “process”	  when	  patent	  law	  was	  codified	  in	  the	  Patent	  Act	  of	  1952.	  	  Chakrabarty,	  447	  U.S.	  at	  309.	   	  There	  are	  three	  types	  of	  patents:	  utility,	  design	  and	  plant.	   	  The	  term	  of	  a	  new	  patent	  is	  twenty	  years	  from	  the	  date	  on	  which	  the	  application	  for	  the	  patent	  was	  filed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  or,	   in	  special	  cases,	   from	  the	  date	  an	  earlier	  related	  application	  was	  filed.	  77. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  154(a)(1).	  78. 	  See	  Bonito	  Boats,	  Inc.	  v.	  Thunder	  Craft	  Boats,	  Inc.,	  109	  S.	  Ct.	  971,	  975	  (1989).	  79. 	  See	  id.	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The	   entire	   patent	   system	   is	   structured	   carefully	   to	   encourage	   the	  creation	   and	   disclosure	   of	   “new,	   useful	   and	   non-­‐obvious	   advances	   in	  technology”	  by	  providing	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  exploit	  the	  invention	  for	  a	  certain	   time	   and	   to	   prevent	   others	   from	   doing	   the	   same	   during	   that	  time.80	   	   The	   patent	   regime	   takes	   seriously	   this	   “rights-­‐for-­‐disclosure”	  bargain	  with	  society.81	  	  The	  balance	  is	  maintained	  in	  the	  race	  run	  on	  two	  parallel	  tracks:	  the	  race	  to	  get	  improved	  products	  to	  market	  quickly	  and	  the	   urgency	   (indeed	   the	   requirement)	   to	   share	   existing	   know-­‐how	   so	  second-­‐generation	   inventors	  may	   innovate	   beyond	  what	   already	   exists.	  	  This	  example	  from	  patent,	  of	  the	  balance	  between	  protection	  and	  access	  by	   second-­‐generation	   creators	   for	   further	   innovation,	   could	   be	  appropriated	   by	   copyright	   reformers	   to	   protect	   and,	   as	   the	   argument	  goes,	   incentivize	   creators.	   	   Such	   an	   approach	   would	   return	   (or	   leave	  intact	   in	   the	   first	   instance)	   sufficient	   material	   for	   second-­‐generation	  creators	   to	   access,	   borrow,	   and	   re-­‐contextualize	  material	   in	   a	  way	   that	  benefits	   society	   without	   causing	   undue	   market	   harm	   to	   the	   copyright	  owner.	  Similarly,	   copyright	   has	   its	   own	  quid	   pro	   quo	   of	   rights	   via	   the	   idea-­‐expression	   dichotomy.	   	   Unfortunately,	   even	   when	   ideally	   calibrated,	  copyright	   law	   struggles	   to	   ensure	   a	   copyright	   owner’s	   right	   to	   their	  “original	   expression”	  while	   still	   continuing	   to	  encourage	  others	   to	  build	  freely	   upon	   the	   ideas	   and	   information	   conveyed	   by	   an	   underlying	   a	  work.82	  
C.	  	  Copyright	  1.	  	  Policy	  Considerations	  and	  the	  Law	  Copyright	   law	   protects	   literary	   and	   artistic	   intellectual	   productions	  not	   protectable	   as	   trade	   secrets	   that	   generally	   require	   no	   reverse	  engineering	  to	  exploit.83	  	  This	  vulnerability	  is	  a	  proffered	  justification	  for	  a	   longer	   term	   of	   exclusive	   protection.84	   	   Copyright	   protection,	   from	   an	  economic	  perspective,	  balances	  the	  costs	  to	  society	  of	  limiting	  access	  to	  a	  protected	  work	  with	  the	  purported	  incentives	  for	  the	  author	  to	  create	  the	  work	   in	   the	   first	   place.85	   	   Further,	   it	   presupposes	   that,	   absent	   an	  
 80. 	  See	  id.	  at	  977.	  81. 	  See	  Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  19.	  82. 	  See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  903;	   John	  Shepard	  Wiley,	   Jr.,	  Copyright	  at	   the	  School	  of	  
Patent,	  58	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  119,	  123	  (1991)	  (noting	  the	  “false	  dichotomy”	  of	  idea	  and	  expression).	  83. 	  See	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  493.	  84. 	  See	  id.	  85. 	  See	  William	  M.	  Landes	  &	  Richard	  A.	  Posner,	  An	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  18	   J.	   LEG.	   STUD.	   325,	   326	   (1989),	   available	   at	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economic	   incentive,	   fewer	   works	   would	   be	   created	   or	   at	   least	   fewer	  would	   be	   disseminated	   into	   the	   cultural	   repository.86	   	   This	   concern	   is	  reflected	   in	   the	   legislative	   history	   of	   the	   1909	   version	   of	   the	   Copyright	  Act:	  In	   enacting	   a	   copyright	   law	   Congress	   must	   consider	  .	  .	  .	   two	  questions:	   First,	   how	   much	   will	   the	   legislation	   stimulate	   the	  producer	  and	  so	  benefit	  the	  public;	  and	  second,	  how	  much	  will	  the	  monopoly	   granted	  be	  detrimental	   to	   the	  public.	   	   The	  granting	  of	  such	   exclusive	   rights,	   under	   the	   proper	   terms	   and	   conditions,	  confers	   a	  benefit	   upon	   the	  public	   that	  outweighs	   the	   evils	   of	   the	  temporary	  monopoly.87	  The	   justification	   of	   a	   copyright	  monopoly	   rests	   on	   the	   presumption	  that	   initial	  production	  costs	  are	  often	  higher	   than	   reproduction	  costs	  of	  the	   same	   creative	   work.88	   	   Achieving	   the	   delicate	   and	   elusive	   balance	  between	   access	   and	   incentives	   is	   an	   ever-­‐present	   concern	   of	   copyright	  law.	   	   This	   central	   struggle	   is	   made	   all	   the	   more	   complex	   by	   digital	  technologies	   that	   allow	   for	   inexpensive,	   perfect	   reproductions,	   and	  immediate	   capabilities	   to	   disseminate	   them	   widely—with	   or	   without	  permission.	  Much	  debate	  exists	  over	  the	  true	  policy	  goals	  and	  primary	  objectives	  of	   the	   copyright	  monopoly.89	   	  However,	   it	   can	  all	   be	   summed	  up	   in	  one	  overarching	   purpose:	   to	   foster	   expressive	   and	   diverse	   creative	  production	  and	  to	  disseminate	  knowledge.90	  	  The	  latter	  purpose	  serves	  to	  underwrite	   democratic	   culture	   by	   supporting	   the	   free	   exchange	   of	  information	  and	  diversity	  of	  expression.91	  
 http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/89land1.html	   (last	   visited	   Aug.	   13,	   2012);	   see	   also	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  4–5.	  86. 	  See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  5.	  Landes	  correctly	  notes,	  however,	  that	  “[t]o	  be	  sure,	  some	  original	  works	  will	  still	  be	  created	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  copyright	  protection.”	  I	  assert	  this	  point	  cannot	  be	  overstated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  normative	  behaviors	  of	  collaboration,	  cumulative	  creation	  and	  sharing	  via	  the	  Internet.	  87. 	  H.R.	  REP.	  NO.	  2222,	  60th	  Cong.,	  2d	  Sess.	  7	  (1909).	  88. See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  5.	  89. See	  Neil	  Weinstock	  Netanel,	  Asserting	  Copyright’s	  Democratic	  Principles	  in	  the	  Global	  
Arena,	  51	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  217,	  226	  (1998).	  90. See	  id.	  91. See	   id.	   at	  248.	   	  The	  author	   further	  asserts	   copyright	   informs	  democratic	   culture	   in	  three	  ways:	  1)	  providing	  an	  incentive	  to	  produce	  and	  disseminate	  of	  original	  expression;	  2)	  to	  support	  a	  sector	  of	  diverse	  of	  expressive	  activity	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  government;	  and	  3)	  highlighting	  the	  value	  of	  individual	  creativity.	  	  Id.	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2.	  	  The	  Copyright	  Act	  Copyright	   exists	   automatically	   when	   an	   original	   literary	   or	   artistic	  work	  is	  fixed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  any	  tangible	  medium	  of	  expression	  in	  a	  copy	  or	  phonorecord.	  In	   general,	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   gives	   a	   copyright	   owner	   the	   exclusive	  right,	  and	  authorizes	  others,	  to	  reproduce	  the	  work,	  to	  prepare	  derivative	  works	  based	  on	  the	  original,	  to	  distribute	  copies	  of	  the	  work	  to	  the	  public	  by	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership,	  or	  by	  rental,	   lease,	  or	   lending,	   to	  perform	  the	  work	  publicly,	  to	  display	  the	  work	  publicly,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sound	   recordings,	   to	   perform	   the	   work	   publicly	   by	   means	   of	   a	   digital	  audio	  transmission.92	  But	   copyright	   is	   not	   absolute;	   the	   rights	   are	   limited	   in	   several	  important	   respects.	   The	   purpose	   of	   limiting	   doctrines	   is	   to	   balance	  economic	   incentives	   with	   access	   and	   other	   costs	   to	   society	   in	   order	   to	  promote	   economic	   efficiency.93	   	   First,	   copyright	   only	   protects	   tangible	  expression,	  not	   ideas.94	   	   Second,	   copyright	  protects	  against	   copying,	  but	  not	   independent	   creation.95	  Another	   important	   limitation	   is	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine.96	   	   Therefore,	   a	   defendant	   in	   an	   infringement	   action	   can	   show,	  for	  example,	   that	   the	  resulting	  work	  was	  created	   independently,	   that	  he	  appropriated	   only	   non-­‐copyrighted	   elements,	   or	   that	   the	   use	   was	   de	  
minimis97	  or	  fair.98	  3.	  	  Fair	  Use	  “[W]e	   must	   recognize	   that	   what	   copyright	   leaves	   unregulated—the	  ‘fair	  use	  economy’—is	  as	  economically	  significant	  as	  what	  it	  regulates.”99	  	  Thomas	  Rogers	  &	  Andrew	  Szamosszegi	  
 92. See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  873	  (citing	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  106(1)–(6)	  (2012)).	  93. See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  7–8.	  94. 17	   U.S.C.	   §	   102(b).	   See	   Landes,	   supra	   note	   46,	   at	   8	   (recognizing	   that	   attempts	   to	  protect	   ideas	   via	   copyright	   would	   involve	   substantial	   administrative	   and	   enforcement	   costs	  without	  requisite	  benefits).	  95. See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  8.	  96. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107.	  97. Ringgold	  v.	  Black	  Entm’t	  Television,	   Inc.,	  126	  F.3d	  70	  (2d	  Cir.	  1997)	  (noting	  courts	  ask	  whether	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  amount	  of	  the	  original	  work	  was	  used).	  But	  see	  Bridgeport	  Music	  v.	  Dimension	  Films,	  410	  F.3d	  792,	  800–01	  (6th	  Cir.	  2005)	  (holding	  that	  any	  sampling	  of	  another's	  copyrighted	   sound	   recording,	  no	  matter	  how	  de	  minimis,	   automatically	   constituted	   copyright	  infringement).	  98. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107.	  	  99. See	  Thomas	  Rogers	  &	  Andrew	  Szamosszegi,	  Fair	  Use	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Economy,	  COMPUTER	  &	   COMM.	   INDUSTRY	   ASS’N	   (2011)	  http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000526/CCIA-­‐FairUseintheUSEconomy-­‐2011.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  10,	  2012).	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  Fair	  use	  finds	  its	  origins	  in	  Folsom	  v.	  Marsh.100	  	  Congress	  codified	  the	  fair	  use	  defense	  in	  the	  1976	  version	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  and	  included	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  list	  of	  permitted	  uses.101	  	  The	  doctrine	  allows	  a	  third	  party	  to	   use	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   without	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   consent	   for	  certain	   purposes	   and	   under	   certain	   conditions.	   	   It	   is	   determined	   on	   a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.102	  The	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  was	  crafted	  to	  create,	  and	  to	  preserve,	   enough	   creative	   “space”	   for	   a	   second	   author	   to	   copy	   a	   prior	  author’s	   work	   within	   the	   context	   of	   protecting	   an	   original	   author’s	  copyright	   monopoly.103	   	   This	   legal	   “space”	   is	   obviously	   essential	   for	  appropriation	   artists	   to	   copy	   and	   adapt	   existing	   works	   to	   innovatively	  create	  beyond	  the	  original.	  The	  Act	  provides	  examples	  of	  preferred	  “productive”	  uses	  that,	  even	  if	  unauthorized,	   are	   roughly	   consistent	   with	   economic	   efficiency	   because	  they	  allow	  for	  an	  “otherwise	  beneficial	  exchange”	  and	  therefore	  provide	  a	  “net	  social	  gain.”104	  	  In	  the	  quid	  pro	  quo	  exchange	  of	  rights,	  owners	  agree	  impliedly	   to	   unauthorized	   but	   productive	   uses,	   notwithstanding	   any	  potential	   harm	   to	   the	   rights	   holder.105	   	   Productive	   uses,	   like	   those	  enumerated	   in	   section	   107,	   are	   deemed	   in	   some	   cases	   to	   be	  “transformative,”	   in	   contrast	   to	  merely	   reproductive	   uses	   that	   function	  instead	  as	  market	  replacements	  of	  the	  original.106	  	  The	  former	  is	  believed	  unlikely	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   market	   substitute	   or	   impact	   negatively	   any	  anticipated	  license	  revenue	  potential.107	  Fair	  use	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  “borrowing	  is	  not	  the	  norm”	  in	   the	   creative	   process.	   	   Therefore,	   unauthorized	   uses	   should	   be	  regulated	  and	  limited	  accordingly.108	  	  The	  doctrine	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	   necessary	   incident	   of	   the	   constitutional	   directive	   to	   promote	   cultural	  progress	   “since	   a	   prohibition	   of	   such	   use	   would	   inhibit	   subsequent	  writers	   from	   attempting	   to	   improve	   upon	   prior	   works	   and	   thus	  .	  .	  .	  frustrate	  the	  very	  ends	  sought	  to	  be	  attained.”109	  
 100. Folsom	  v.	  Marsh,	  6	  Hunt	  Mer.	  Mag.	  175,	  9	  F.	  Cas.	  342	  (C.C.D.	  Mass.	  1841).	  101. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107.	  102. See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  877.	  103. See	  Olufunmilayo	  B.	  Arewa,	  The	  Freedom	  to	  Copy:	  Copyright,	  Creation	  and	  Context,	  41	   U.C.	   DAVIS	   L.	   REV.	   477,	   547–48	   (2007).	   	   “[C]opying	   considered	   in	   this	   context	   typically	  related	   to	   reprinting	   existing	  works,	   at	   times	   in	   an	   abridged	   format.”	   	   Id.	   (citing	  WILLIAM	   F.	  PATRY,	  THE	  FAIR	  USE	  PRIVILEGE	  IN	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW	  5	  (1985)).	  104. 	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  9.	  105. Id.	  at	  10–11.	  106. Campbell	  v.	  Acuff-­‐Rose	  Music,	  Inc.,	  510	  U.S.	  569,	  578–79	  (1994).	  107. Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  10.	  108. Arewa,	  supra	  note	  103,	  at	  551.	  109. Harper	  &	  Row,	  Publishers,	  Inc.	  v.	  Nation	  Enters.,	  471	  U.S.	  539,	  549	  (1985)	  (citing	  H.	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Courts	  apply	  a	  four-­‐factor	  test	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  unauthorized	  use	   is	   fair.110	   	  The	   first	   factor	  analyzes	   the	  character	  and	  purpose	  of	   the	  defendant’s	   use	   of	   the	   original	   work	   to	   assess	   the	   productive	   or	  transformative	  nature	  of	  the	  new	  work.111	  	  This	  first	  factor	  is	  considered	  the	  “heart”	  of	  the	  fair	  use	  inquiry.112	  	  Courts	  have	  recognized	  two	  factors	  necessary	  to	  measure	  purpose	  and	  character:	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  use	  is	  “transformative,”	   and	   the	  profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	   character	  of	   the	  use.113	   	  A	  work	  is	  transformative	  if	  it	  embodies	  contributions	  by	  the	  second	  author	  that	  are	  socially	  beneficial	  for	  a	  purpose	  or	  in	  a	  manner	  different	  from	  the	  copied	  work.114	  	  In	  other	  words,	  courts	  assess	  whether	  the	  resulting	  work	  merely	   “supersedes”	   the	   objects	   of	   the	   copied	   work	   “or	   instead	   adds	  something	  new,	  with	  a	  further	  purpose	  or	  different	  character,	  altering	  the	  first	   with	   new	   expression,	   meaning,	   or	   message.”115	   	   Protecting	  transformative	  uses	  is	  particularly	  important	  and	  valuable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  appropriation	  art	  production	  because	  the	  stock	  in	  trade	  of	  appropriation	  art	  is	  transforming	  what	  already	  exists	  into	  a	  new	  creative	  work.	  Transformative	  uses	  certainly	   include	  the	  enumerated	  purposes,	  but	  they	   also	   go	   beyond	   them.116	   	   The	   transformative	   analysis	   seems	   to	  contemplate	   a	   wider	   spectrum	   of	   permissible	   uses.	   In	   light	   of	   this	  possibility,	   one	   scholar	   asserts	   that	   the	   transformative	   inquiry	   can	   be	  reformed	  to	  include:	  1)	  creative	  works	  beyond	  the	  enumerated	  purposes;	  2)	   expressive	   purpose	   beyond	   the	  merely	   functional;	   3)	   the	   sufficiency	  (or	  lack)	  of	  minimal	  aesthetic	  alterations;	  and	  4)	  less	  importance	  given	  to	  market	  harm	  when	  the	  use	  is	  deemed	  transformative.117	  To	   survive	   an	   infringement	   inquiry,	   the	   resulting	   work	   must	   be	  
 BALL,	  LAW	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  AND	  LITERARY	  PROPERTY	  260,	  260	  (1944)).	  110. Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  879.	  The	  four	  factors	  are:	  (1)	   the	   purpose	   and	   character	   of	   the	   use,	   including	   whether	   such	   use	   is	   of	   a	  commercial	   nature	   or	   is	   for	   nonprofit	   educational	   purposes;	   (2)	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  copyrighted	  work;	  (3)	  the	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   copyrighted	   work	   as	   a	   whole;	   and	   (4)	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   use	   upon	   the	   potential	  market	  for	  or	  value	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work.	  111. Id.	  at	  879	  (citing	  MARSHALL	  A.	  LEAFFER,	  UNDERSTANDING	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW	  487,	  495	  (5th	  ed.	  2010)).	   “Productive	  use”	  occurs	  when	  another	  uses	   the	  copyrighted	  works	  by	  adding	  her	  own	   creative	   edge.	   	   LEAFFER,	   UNDERSTANDING	   COPYRIGHT	   LAW	   at	   490.	   	   “Transformative	   use”	  occurs	  when	  value	  is	  added	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  by	  “new	  information,	  new	  aesthetics,	  new	  insights	  and	  understandings.”	  Id.	  112. Davis	  v.	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.,	  246	  F.3d	  152,	  174	  (2d	  Cir.	  2001).	  113. Gorman,	  supra	  note	  31,	  at	  301.	  114. See	   Pierre	   N.	   Leval,	   Toward	   a	   Fair	   Use	   Standard,	   103	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   1105,	   1111	  (1990).	  115. 	  Gorman,	  supra	  note	  31,	  at	  302	  (citing	  Campbell,	  510	  U.S.	  at	  579).	  116. 	  See	  id.	  at	  302.	  117. 	  See	  id.	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creative,	   original,	   and	   transformative.	   	   These	   works	   must	   also	   serve	  primarily	   a	   beneficial	   and	  productive	  purpose	  beyond	   commercial	   gain.	  	  Of	   course,	   the	   first	   factor	   is	   just	   one	   of	   four.	   	   A	   court	   also	   assesses	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  copied	  work,	  the	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  work	  that	  is	  appropriated	  and	   incorporated	   into	   the	  resulting	  work,	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  potential	  market.	  	  However,	  assuming	  the	  character	  or	  purpose	  of	  use	  is	  sufficiently	  transformative,	  less	  weight	  could	  presumably	  be	  given	  to	   the	   other	   three	   factors,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   appropriation	   art	  forms.	  Until	   fair	   use	   reflects	   the	   cultural	   context	   and	   norms	   of	   how	  collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   art	   forms	   like	   visual	   art	   and	   music	   are	  actually	  created,	  it	  will	  fail	  to	  embrace	  or	  at	  least	  protect	  the	  production	  of	  innovative	  works	  like	  Koons’s	  visual	  collage	  and	  Public	  Enemy’s	  aural	  collage.	  	  Yet,	  until	  originality	  (discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below)	  no	  longer	  trumps	  collaborative	  and	  cumulative	  creative	  production,	  such	  normative	  realities	  will	  be	  viewed	  through	  the	  myopic	  lens	  of	  an	  idealized	  notion	  of	  independent	  creation.	  In	   light	   of	   copyright’s	   goals	   of	   societal	   and	   cultural	   progress,	  transformative	  uses	  that,	  through	  cumulative	  creativity,	  re-­‐contextualize	  the	  original	   in	  a	  new	   light	  advance	   those	  goals	  and	  therefore	  militate	   in	  favor	  of	  fair	  use,	  at	   least	  as	  to	  the	  first	  factor	  in	  the	  analysis.118	   	  A	  wider	  spectrum	   of	   fair	   use	   in	   general	   and	   transformative	   uses	   in	   particular,	   I	  argue,	   broadens	   access	   to	   copyrighted	   works	   by	   second-­‐generation	  authors	   who	   seek	   to	   innovate	   further	   beyond	   them,	   presumably	   in	  alignment	  with	  copyright’s	  constitutional	  goal	  of	  progress.119	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  public	   will	   benefit	   from	   increased	   creative	   production,	   dissemination,	  and	   deposit	   of	   those	   creative	   endeavors	   into	   the	   cultural	   reservoir—indeed	  encouraging	  “cultural	  progress.”	  4.	  	  A	  Closer	  Look	  at	  Originality	  Copyright	  values	  originality;	  that	  is,	  a	  literary	  or	  artistic	  work	  that	  is	  created	   independently	   rather	   than	   copied	   and	   possesses	   some	   low	  modicum	  of	  creativity.	  	  Assessing	  originality	  is	  a	  threshold	  question	  used	  to	   achieve	   administrative	   and	   enforcement	   efficiency	   by	   screening	   out	  works	  that	  would	  be	  created	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  copyright	  protection,	  which	  is	  currently	  life	  of	  the	  author	  plus	  seventy	  years	  after	  the	  author’s	  death.120	   	  Originality,	   of	   course,	   does	  not	  mean	  novelty.	   	   Therefore,	   two	  
 118. 	  See	  id.	  at	  308–09,	  318.	  119. See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  879.	  120. See	   William	   M.	   Landes,	   Copyright,	   Borrowed	   Images	   and	   Appropriation	   Art:	   An	  
Economic	  Approach,	  9	  GEO.	  MASON	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  4–5	  (2000).	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works	   deemed	   similar	   (even	   substantially	   so	   or	   the	   same)	   may	   both	  receive	  protection	  if	  created	  independently.121	  The	  value	  of	  originality	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “by-­‐product”	  of	  the	  Romantic	   authorship	  myth.	   	   That	  myth	   suggests	  writers	   of	   significance	  “break	   altogether	   with	   tradition	   to	   create	   something	   utterly	   new,	  unique—and	   in	   a	  word,	   “original.”122	   	   Interestingly,	   even	   the	   “collective	  work”	   is	   defined	   in	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   as	   “constituting	   separate	   and	  independent	   works	   in	   themselves”	   that	   are	   combined	   to	   constitute	   a	  collective	  whole.123	   	   The	   concept	   of	   the	   Romantic	   author,	   however,	   is	   a	  relatively	  recent	  phenomenon	  and	  is	  completely	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  ways	  by	  which	  much	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  productions	  are	  created.124	  Earlier	   expositions	   of	   authorship	   have	   shown	   that,	   as	   early	   as	   the	  mid–1700s,	  writers	  were	  not	  elevated	  above	  other	  contributors,	  but	  were	  viewed	   as	   one	   of	   numerous	   participants	   in	   creating	   a	   book.125	   	   This	  notion	  was	   solidified	  by	  William	  Wordsworth;	  he	  described	  his	   concept	  of	   “genius”	   as	   “the	   introduction	   of	   a	   new	   element	   into	   the	   intellectual	  universe:	  or	  .	  .	  .	  the	  application	  of	  powers	  to	  object	  on	  which	  they	  had	  not	  before	  been	  exercised,	  or	  the	  employment	  of	  them	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  as	  to	  produce	  effects	  hitherto	  unknown.”126	  Michel	   Foulcault	   is	   credited	   for	   having	   brought	   the	   fallacy	   of	   this	  belief	   to	   light	   in	   his	   1969	   essay,	  What	   is	   an	   Author?127	   	   In	   that	   essay,	  
 121. See	  Gorman,	  supra	  note	  31,	  at	  292.	  122. Martha	  Woodmansee,	  On	  the	  Author	  Effect:	  Recovering	  Collectivity,	  10	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	   ENT.	   L.J.	   279,	   280	   (1992)	   (also	   available	   at	  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/92wood.html).	  123. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  101.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  term	  “joint	  work”	  appears	  technically	  to	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	   collaborative	  effort,	   in	   that	   it	   recognizes	  as	  one	  work	  separate	   creative	  efforts.	   Id.	  However,	  some	  courts	  have	  held	  a	  collaborator	  to	  be	  a	  “joint	  author”	  only	  if	  she	  contributes	  a	  separately	  copyrightable	  work,	  at	  least	  when	  the	  copyrightability	  test	  is	  applied.	  	  See	  Erickson	  v.	  Trinity	  Theatre,	  Inc.,	  13	  F.3d	  1061,	  1069	  (1994).	  	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  court	  considered	  two	  ways	  to	   determine	   whether	   a	   collaborator’s	   contribution	   was	   sufficient	   to	   rise	   to	   the	   level	   of	  authorship	   required	   for	   copyright	  protection.	   	  One	   is	  Nimmer’s	  de	  minimis	   test	   that	   requires	  only	   that	   the	   combined	   product	   of	   joint	   efforts	   be	   copyrightable	   (an	   original	   work	   of	  authorship	  fixed	  in	  a	  tangible	  medium).	  	  The	  other,	  which	  the	  court	  adopted	  ultimately,	  was	  the	  Goldstein	   copyrightability	   test.	   	   That	   test	   requires	   that	   each	   person’s	   contribution	   be	  separately	  copyrightable.	  	  Erickson,	  13	  F.3d	  at	  1069.	  124. See	  Woodmansee,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  280.	  125. Id.	  126. See	   id.	  at	  280	  (citing	  William	  Wordsworth,	  Essay,	  Supplementary	  to	  the	  Preface,	   in	  LITERARY	  CRITICISM	  OF	  WILLIAM	  WORDSWORTH	  158,	  184	  (Paul	  M.	  Zall	  ed.,	  1966)).	  127. See	   generally	   Michel	   Foucault,	   What	   is	   an	   Author?,	   in	   TEXTUAL	   STRATEGIES:	  PERSPECTIVES	   IN	   POST-­‐STRUCTURALIST	   CRITICISM	   141–60	   (Josué	   V.	   Harari	   ed.,	   1979).	   Peter	   Jaszi	  explained	  Foucault’s	  influence	  as	  follows:	  “[he]	  asked	  literary	  critics	  and	  historians	  to	  question	  the	   received	  modern	   idea	   of	   ‘authorship,’	   and	   to	   reimagine	   its	   future	  by	   reunderstanding	   its	  past.”	   Peter	   Jaszi,	  On	   the	   Author	   Effect:	   Contemporary	   Copyright	   and	   Collective	   Creativity,	   10	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  293,	  293	  (1991–92).	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Foulcault	   declared	   the	   Romantic	   author	   a	   modern	   creation	   and	  questioned	  its	  legitimacy	  in	  modern	  writing	  practices.	  	  However,	  from	  the	  Middle-­‐Ages	   through	   the	   Renaissance	   period,	   collaborative	   and	  cumulative	   writings	   were	   the	   predominant	   and	   most	   valued	   means	   of	  creating.128	   	   Additionally,	   in	   other	   cultures,	   collaboration	   and	   oral	  traditions	   are	   lauded	   for	   preserving	   and	   passing	   on	   cultural	  knowledge.129	  In	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  it	  was	  common	  for	  clergy	  to	  “borrow”	  from	  and	  build	  upon	  existing	  texts.130	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  light	  of	  digital	  technology	  and	  the	  Internet,	  coupled	  with	  user	  expectations	  and	  new	  “social	  networking”	  norms,	   most	   of	   the	   writing	   created	   in	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century—and	  creativity	   in	   general—is	   in	   some	   way	   cumulative	   and	   collaborative.131	  	  This	   leads	  me	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	  appropriation	   in	   the	  production	  of	  literary	   and	   artistic	   works	   is	   more	   the	   rule	   than	   the	   exception.	  	  Accordingly,	   if	   questioned	   in	   writing	   disciplines,	   the	   idea	   of	   Romantic	  authorship	   is	   even	   more	   suspect	   in	   other	   creative	   disciplines—most	  notably	  music	  performance	  and	  visual	  arts,	  especially	  when	  expressed	  as	  appropriation	  art.	  5.	  	  Overprotection	  and	  Misuse	  The	  utilitarian	  goal	  of	  copyright	  strikes	  a	  theoretical	  balance	  between	  incentivizing	   the	   author	  with	   exclusive	   rights	   and	   protecting	   the	   users’	  ability	   to	   make	   other	   uses	   that	   fundamentally	   support	   societal	  progress.132	   	   But	   domestic	   policy	   has	   given	   way	   to	   the	   globalization	   of	  copyright.133	   	   In	   light	   of	   the	   integration	   of	   global	   communications	   and	  financial	  and	  cultural	  markets,	  continued	  globalization	  is	  inevitable.134	  	  In	  turn,	   this	   reality	   renders	   the	   copyright	   regime	   particularly	   vulnerable	  and	  unstable	  given	  the	  rapid	  and	  constant	  advances	  in	  technology	  used	  to	  create,	  reproduce,	  and	  disseminate	  creative	  works	  in	  changing	  domestic	  
 128. See	   Woodmansee,	   supra	   note	   122,	   at	   281	   (“From	   the	   Middle	   Ages	   right	   down	  through	   the	  Renaissance	  new	  writing	  derived	   its	  value	  and	  authority	   from	   its	  affiliation	  with	  the	  texts	  that	  preceded	  it,	  its	  derivation	  rather	  than	  its	  deviation	  from	  prior	  texts.”).	  129. See	  Netanel,	   supra	   note	   89,	   at	   274	   (noting	   that	   art	   and	   literature	   are	   oriented	   to	  transmit	  “the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  ancients”	  rather	  than	  to	  proffer	  new	  concepts	  and	  ideas).	  130. See	  Woodmansee,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  283.	  131. See	   id.	   at	  288	   (citing	  a	  1990	  study	  of	  professional	  writing	  practices	   that	   included	  business,	  government,	  industry,	  the	  sciences	  and	  social	  sciences	  conducted	  by	  Andrea	  Lunsford	  &	   Lisa	   Ede,	   SINGLUAR	   TEXTS/PLURAL	   AUTHORS	   (1990)).	   The	   author	   suggested	   that	   the	   last	  purported	  “bastion”	  of	  independent	  creation	  may	  be	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  humanities.	  	  Id.	  at	  289.	  132. 	   See	  Marshall	   A.	   Leaffer,	  Engineering	   Competitive	   Policy	   and	   Copyright	  Misuse,	   19	  DAYTON	  L.	  REV.	  1087	  (1994).	  133. 	  See	  Netanel,	  supra	  note	  89,	  at	  219.	  134. 	  See	  id.	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and	  international	  markets.135	  Taken	   together,	   governmental	   overprotection	   coupled	   with	   private	  misuse	   has	   created	   an	   environment	   extremely	   hostile	   to	   creativity	   and	  the	   societal	   progress	   that	   would	   follow.	   	   Add	   to	   that	   the	   reality	   of	  copyright	   as	   a	   strict	   liability	   rule	   and	   the	   widely	   and	   wildly	   varying	  statutory	   damages	   awards,	   and	   one	   can	   see	   clearly	   how	   muddied	   the	  copyright	  waters	  have	  become.	  
a.	  	  Overprotection	  A	  series	  of	  legislative	  adjustments	  to	  extend	  the	  breadth	  and	  duration	  of	   copyright	   protection	   coupled	   with	   pro-­‐rights-­‐holder	   judicial	  interpretations	   have	   led	   to	   substantial	   overprotection	   of	   the	   copyright	  monopoly.	   	   In	   fact,	   copyright,	  unbridled,	   renders	  access	  more	  expensive	  by	  driving	  up	  transaction	  costs.136	  	  One	  of	  the	  greatest	  threats	  to	  fair	  uses	  of	  existing	  works	   is	   the	  stifling	  effect	  at	   the	  axis	  of	   rights	  and	  access	  by	  onerous,	   overly	   restrictive	   copyright	   laws.	   	   One	   clear	   example	   is	   the	  deleterious	   impact	   of	   copyright	   overprotection	   on	   visual	   and	   musical	  appropriation	  art	   forms	  due	   in	  substantial	  part	   to	   traditional	  notions	  of	  independent	   creation	   and	   its	   purported	   value	   over	   collaborative	   and	  cumulative	  means	  of	  creation.137	  However,	  Congress	  has	   responded	   throughout	   the	  years	   to	   lobbying	  efforts	  of	  those	  industries	  most	  impacted	  by	  market	  harm	  concerns	  (the	  software	   and	   entertainment	   industries,	   primarily)	   by	   continuing	   to	  extend	   the	   duration	   and	   substantive	   protection	   of	   the	   copyright	  monopoly.138	   	   Specifically,	   from	   the	   mid-­‐twentieth	   century	   until	   today,	  the	   confluence	   of	   economic,	   ideological,	   and	   political	   factors	   has	   led	  Congress	  to	  extend	  and	  to	  expand	  the	  subject-­‐matter,	  scope,	  and	  duration	  of	   the	   copyright	  monopoly	   far	   beyond	   “exclusive	   rights”	   to	   authors	   and	  inventors	  for	  “limited	  times.”139	  	  In	  fact,	  for	  every	  amendment	  to	  the	  1976	  Copyright	  Act	   that	   afforded	   rights	  holders’	   greater	  protection,	   little—or	  at	   least	   less—has	  been	  done	  to	  preserve	  space	   for	  access	  to	  and	  uses	  of	  
 135. 	  See	  id.	  at	  225.	  136. 	  See	  id.	  at	  248.	  137. 	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  885–93.	  138. 	  See	  generally	  Piracy	  and	  Counterfeiting	  Amendments	  Act	  of	  1982,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  97-­‐180,	  96	  Stat.	  91,	  93	  (amending	  §	  506(a)	  [criminal	  liability],	  title	  17,	  United	  States	  Code	  and	  title	  18	   of	   the	  United	   States	   Code),	   enacted	  May	   24,	   1982;	   Semiconductor	   Chip	   Protection	   Act	   of	  1984,	   title	   III	   of	   Pub.	   L.	   No.	   98-­‐620,	   98	   Stat.	   3335,	   3347	   (provided	   design	   protection	   for	  semiconductor	   chips),	   November	   8,	   1984;	   Visual	   Artists	   Rights	   Act	   of	   1990,	   title	   VI	   of	   the	  Judicial	  Improvements	  Act	  of	  1990,	  Pub.	  L.	  101-­‐650,	  104	  Stat.	  5089,	  5128;	  Architectural	  Works	  Copyright	  Protection	  Act,	   title	  VII	  of	   the	   Judicial	   Improvements	  Act	  of	  1990,	  Pub.	  L.	  101-­‐650,	  104	  Stat.	  5089,	  5133	  (1990).	  139. Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  869–70.	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copyrighted	   works	   that	   might	   maintain	   the	   delicate	   (and	   at	   times	  illusory)	  balance	  of	  the	  rights/access	  dichotomy.140	  The	  pro-­‐rights-­‐holder	  protectionism	  via	  the	  strengthening	  of	  both	  the	  breadth	   and	   duration	   of	   copyright	   certainly	   may	   account	   for	   the	  economic	  boom	  for	  certain	   IP-­‐intensive	   industries.	   	  The	  economic	  value	  of	  intellectual	  property—indeed	  its	  propertization—has	  grown	  in	  kind.141	  	  As	   the	  economic	  growth	  of	   the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  particularly	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   has	   grown	   incrementally—and	   sometimes	   sputtered	  along—(even	  despite	  a	  slight	  uptick	  in	  recent	  years),142	  the	  bottom	  lines	  of	   industries,	   fueled	   primarily	   by	   intellectual	   property	   production	   and	  exploitation,	  continue	  to	  grow	  at	  an	  exponential	  pace.	  Nonetheless,	   “fair	   use”	   industries	   have	   contributed	   significantly	   to	  this	   country’s	   bottom	   line.	   	   The	   2010	   Computer	   &	   Communications	  Industry	  Association	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  	  The	  updated	  study	  shows	  the	  significant	  contribution	  made	  to	  our	  economy	  by	  industries	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  limitations	  to	  copyright	  protection	  when	  engaged	  in	  commerce.143	  	  This	   report	   about	   “fair	  use”	   industries	   shows	   that	   the	   contributions	  are	  significant	  and	  demonstrates	  how	  important	  balanced	  copyright	  is	  to	  the	  national	  economy,	  exports,	   technological	   leadership,	  and	   job	  creation.144	  	  
 140. For	   a	   non-­‐exhaustive	   list	   of	   rights-­‐based	   amendments,	   see	   supra	   note	   138.	   	   The	  following	  is	  an	  illustrative	  list	  of	  access-­‐based	  amendments:	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  96-­‐517,	  94	  Stat.	  3015,	  3028	   (amending	  §101	  and	  §117,	   title	  17,	  United	  States	  Code,	  regarding	   computer	  programs),	  enacted	  December	  12,	  1980;	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  97-­‐366,	  96	  Stat.	  1759	  (amending	  §110	  title	  17,	  United	  
States	   Code,	   regarding	   the	   exemption	   from	   copyright	   liability	   of	   certain	   performances	   of	  nondramatic	  literary	  or	  musical	  works),	  enacted	  October	  25,	  1982;	  Technology,	  Education,	  and	  Copyright	   Harmonization	   Act	   of	   2002,	   Division	   C,	   Title	   III,	   Subtitle	   C	   of	   the	   21st	   Century	  Department	  of	  Justice	  Appropriations	  Authorization	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  107-­‐273,	  116	  Stat.	  1758,	  1910	  (Nov.	  2,	  2002),	  amending,	  17	  U.S.C.	  101,	  et	  seq.	  141. See	  generally	  Mark	  A.	  Lemley	  &	  Philip	   J.	  Weiser,	  Should	  Property	  or	  Liability	  Rules	  
Govern	  Information?,	  85	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  783,	  784	  (2007)	  (citing	  Robert	  P.	  Merges,	  Of	  Property	  Rules,	  
Coase,	  and	  Intellectual	  Property,	  94	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  2655,	  2667	  (1994)).	  142. The	   U.S.	   manufacturing	   sector	   contracted	   in	   June	   2012	   but	   the	   overall	   economy	  grew	   for	   the	   37th	   consecutive	   month.	   INS.	   FOR	   SUPPLY	   MGMT.,	  http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/content.cfm?ItemNumber=10748&navItemNumber=12949	  (last	   visited	   July	   23,	   2012).	   	   The	   sixteen	   manufacturing	   industries	   are:	   Primary	   Metals;	  Fabricated	  Metal	   Products;	   Petroleum	   &	   Coal	   Products;	   Apparel,	   Leather	   &	   Allied	   Products;	  Transportation	   Equipment;	   Miscellaneous	   Manufacturing;	   Furniture	   &	   Related	   Products;	  Plastics	   &	   Rubber	   Products;	   Machinery;	   Textile	  Mills;	  Wood	   Products;	   Electrical	   Equipment,	  Appliances	   &	   Components;	   Food,	   Beverage	  &	   Tobacco	   Products;	   Printing	   &	   Related	   Support	  Activities;	   Chemical	   Products;	   and	   Paper	   Products.	   	   See	   MFRTECH.COM,	  http://www.mfrtech.com/articles/8085.html	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  8,	  2011).	  143. See	  Rogers	  &	  Szamosszegi,	  supra	  note	  99.	  This	  second	  update	  to	  the	  original	  2007	  report	   includes	   data	   for	   two	   additional	   years,	   2008	   and	   2009.	   This	   period	   includes	   data	  reflective	  of	   the	  downturn	  due	  to	  the	  recession	  and	  shows	  that	  even	  fair	  use	  economy	  sector	  were	  negatively	  impacted	  but	  still	  remained	  steady	  when	  measured	  by	  overall	  value	  added	  and	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  144. See	  id.	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The	  report	  is	  important	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  clearly	  the	  value	  of	  fair	  use	   industries	  and	  shows	  that	  they	  promote	   innovation	  and	  are	  a	  major	  catalyst	   of	   the	   U.S.	   economy.145	   	   Examples	   of	   the	   relevant	   industries	  include	   manufacturers	   of	   consumer	   devices	   that	   allow	   for	   personal	  copying	   of	   copyrighted	   works	   (DVR),	   educational	   institutions	   (colleges	  and	   universities),	   software	   developers,	   and	   Internet	   search	   and	   web	  hosting	   providers	   (Google	   and	   AOL).146	   	   Industries	   that	   benefit	   from	  limitations	   on	   copyright	   rely	   on	   the	   non-­‐copyrightability	   of	   facts,147	   the	  idea/expression	   dichotomy,148	   fair	   use,149	   library	   uses,150	   first-­‐sale	  doctrine,151	   Internet	   Service	   Provider	   safe	   harbor	   provisions,152	   the	  copyright	   term	  of	  protection,153	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  copyright	  protection	  in	  U.S.	  Government	  works.154	  The	   report	   summarizes	   economic	   activity	   and	   growth	   in	   five	   areas:	  revenue,	   value-­‐added,	   employment,	   productivity,	   and	   exports.	   	   In	   2008	  and	   2009,	   fair	   use	   industries	   generated	   a	   total	   revenue	   averaging	   $4.6	  trillion,	   a	   thirty-­‐five	   percent	   increase	   over	   2002	   revenues.	   	   Value-­‐added155	   by	   fair	   use-­‐reliant	   industries	   averaged	   $2.4	   trillion,	  approximately	   seventeen	   percent	   of	   the	   total	   U.S.	   current-­‐dollar	   gross	  domestic	  product.	  Some	  may	  argue	  this	  economic	  reality	  lends	  credence	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  strong,	  robust	  intellectual	  property	  laws	  can	  successfully	  incentivize	  and	  spur	  economic	  development.	  	  But	  the	  economic	  incentive	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  promoting	  progress,	  not	  the	  end	  itself.	  	  In	  light	  of	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	   framers	   of	   the	   Constitution	   about	   governmental	  control	   and	   monopolistic	   activities,	   intellectual	   property	   monopolies	  were	  never	  intended	  to	  decimate	  the	  valuable	  cultural	  “space”	  that	  users	  and	  second-­‐generation	  creators	  might	  enjoy	  to	  access	  lawfully	  protected	  
 145. See	  id.	  146. These	   industries	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   “fair	  use”	   industries	  because	   they	   rely	  on	   fair	  use	  and	  other	   limitations	  and	  exceptions	   to	  use	   copyrighted	  works	  without	  permission	   from	  the	  owner.	  147. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  102(a).	  148. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  102(b).	  149. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107.	  150. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  108.	  151. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109.	  152. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  512.	  153. 17	  U.S.C.	  §§	  302–304	  (to	  the	  extent	  one	  views	  the	  current	  duration	  of	  protection	  a	  limitation).	  154. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  105.	  155. Defined	  as	  “a	  firm’s	  total	  output	  minus	  its	  purchases	  of	  intermediate	  inputs	  and	  is	  the	   best	   measurement	   of	   an	   industry’s	   economic	   contribution	   to	   national	   GDP.”	   Rogers	   &	  Szamosszegi,	  supra	  note	  99.	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works	   and	   make	   de	   minimis	   and	   fair	   uses	   of	   them	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  cultural	  and	   technological	  progress.	   	  For	  example,	  none	  of	   the	  exclusive	  rights	   granted	   to	   the	   copyright	   owner	   controlled	   access,	   at	   least	   not	  originally.156	  
b.	  	  Misuse	  In	  addition	  to	  overprotection,	  copyright	  misuse	  is	  another	  concern;	  in	  fact,	  the	  confluence	  of	  the	  two	  is	  likely	  alarming	  to	  appropriation	  artists.	  	  The	  copyright	  misuse	  doctrine,	  an	  affirmative	  defense	  to	  infringement,	  is	  an	   owner’s	   use	   of	   her	   monopoly	   in	   a	   way	   that	   attempts	   to	   extend	  protection	   beyond	   that	   intended	   by	   the	   exclusive	   grant	   or	   necessary	   to	  protect	   economic	   interests	   or	   spur	   innovation	   and	   creative	   production.	  	  Stated	   another	  way,	   it	   is	   use	   of	   copyright	   in	   some	   anticompetitive	  way	  that	   is	   contrary	   to	   the	   public	   policy	   that	   supports	   the	   copyright	  monopoly.157	   	   Copyright	   misuse	   owes	   its	   origin	   to	   the	   patent	   misuse	  doctrine	   articulated	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Morton	   Salt	   Co.	   v.	   G.S.	  
Superego	  Co.158	   	  The	  Court	  acknowledged	  the	  defense	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	   equitable	   doctrine	   of	   unclean	   hands	   to	   the	   patent	   context.159	  	  Thereafter,	   the	   Fourth	  Circuit	   extended	  misuse	   specifically	   to	   copyright	  law	  in	  Lasercomb	  America,	  Inc.	  v.	  Reynolds.160	  Misuse	   can	   come	   in	   the	   form	   of	   both	   private	   technological	   and	  contractual	   fences–encryption	   technology	   in	   the	   former	   instance	   and	  tying161	  in	  the	  latter	  case.	  For	  example,	  these	  fences	  are	  erected	  by	  rights	  holders	   to	   prevent	   or	   at	   least	   substantially	   limit	   access	   even	   to	   non-­‐copyrightable	  elements	  of	  an	  otherwise	  protected	  work,	  or	  limit	  a	  user’s	  ability	   to	   make	   fair	   or	   de	   minimis	   use	   of	   a	   work	   under	   the	   guise	   of	  
 156. 	  See	  infra	  Part	  III.	  C.	  157. 	  See	   JuNelle	  Harris,	  Beyond	  Fair	  Use:	  Expanding	  Copyright	  Misuse	  to	  Protect	  Digital	  
Free	  Speech,	  13	  TEX.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.J.	  83,	  111–12	  (2004).	  	  158. 	  Morton	  Salt	  Co.	  v.	  G.	  S.	  Suppiger	  Co.,	  314	  U.S.	  488	  (1942).	  159. 	  Id.	  at	  491–93.	  It	   is	   said	   that	   the	   equitable	  maxim	   that	   a	   party	   seeking	   the	   aid	   of	   a	   court	   of	   equity	  must	  come	  into	  court	  with	  clean	  hands	  applies	  only	  to	  the	  plaintiff's	  wrongful	  conduct	  in	  the	  particular	  transaction	  which	  raises	  the	  equity,	  enforcement	  of	  which	  is	  sought.	  .	  .	  .	  Undoubtedly,	  'equity	  does	  not	  demand	  that	  its	  suitors	  have	  led	  blameless	  lives,'	  but	  additional	  considerations	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  where	  maintenance	  of	  the	  suit	  concerns	  the	  public	  interest	  as	  well	  as	  the	  private	  interest	  of	  the	  suitors.	  	  	  
Id.	  (citations	  omitted).	  	  160. 	  See	  Harris,	  supra	  note	  157,	  at	  110–11	  (citing	  Lasercomb	  Am.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Reynolds,	  911	  F.2d	  970	  (4th	  Cir.	  1990)).	  161. 	   Tying	   is	   defined	   as	   “an	   agreement	   in	   which	   a	   vendor	   conditions	   the	   sale	   of	   a	  particular	   product	   on	   a	   vendee's	   promise	   to	   purchase	   an	   additional,	   unrelated	   product.”	  See	  THE	   FREE	   DICTIONARY,	   http://legal-­‐dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Tying+Arrangement	   (last	  visited	  Aug.	  10,	  2012).	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copyright	  protection.162	  Although	  I	  am	  a	  strong	  proponent	  of	  copyright	  reform	  to	  realign	  the	  law	   with	   original	   public	   policy	   considerations	   or	   even	   wholesale	  revision163	  or	  creation	  of	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  akin	  to	  the	  SCPA,164	  I	  argue	  that	  strong	  recognition	  of	   the	  existing	  copyright	  misuse	  doctrine	  would	  be	  a	  practical,	   short-­‐term	   solution	   to	   protect	   cumulative	   creation	   in	   creative	  genres	   that	  benefit	   from,	  and	  have	   traditionally	   relied	  on	  such	   in	  a	  way	  that	  causes	  little,	  if	  any,	  market	  harm	  to	  the	  rights	  holder.	  PART	  III:	  	  REVERSE-­‐ENGINEERING	  This	  Part	  explores	  the	  history	  of	  reverse-­‐engineering	  in	  the	  inventive	  context	   under	   trade	   secret	   law	   and	   as	   applied	   to	   digital	   goods	   under	  patent,	   copyright,	   and	   a	   hybrid	   regime.	   	   This	   Part	   also	   explores	   how	  reverse	   engineering	   might	   apply	   to	   appropriation	   art	   forms	   like	   visual	  collage	  and	  digital	  music	  sampling	  used	  to	  create	  aural	  music	  collage.165	  	  I	  note	   at	   the	   outset,	   however,	   that	   attempting	   to	   develop	   a	   coherent	  understanding	   and	   application	   of	   reverse	   engineering	   of	   electronic	  products	  and	  productions	  is	  challenging.	  	  Copyright,	  patent,	  trade	  secret,	  and	  the	  DMCA	  all	  treat	  reverse	  engineering	  differently,166	  yet,	  these	  laws	  often	  apply	  to	  the	  same	  electronic	  goods.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  more	  important	  than	   ever	   to	   reconcile	   inconsistencies	   and	   the	   debilitating	   effects	   of	   a	  schizophrenic	  IP	  system	  on	  the	  whole.167	  In	  Kewanee	  Oil	  Co.	  v.	  Bicron	  Corp.,168	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  described	   the	   process	   of	   “reverse	   engineering”	   as	   “starting	   with	   the	  
 162. 	  See	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  5–6	  (noting	  uses	  by	  rights	  holders	  of	  contracts	  and	  private	  enforcement	  mechanisms	   to	   further	  discourage	  and	   impede	  unauthorized	  access	  and	  use).	   	   The	   author	   also	   notes	   the	   limitations	   of	   contractual	   fences	   in	   that	   they	   are	   difficult	   to	  enforce	   against	   anyone	   other	   than	   parties	   to	   the	   contract.	   	   Id.	   at	   6.	   	   See	   also	   Dan	   L.	   Burk,	  
Anticircumvention	   Misuse,	   50	   UCLA	   L.	   REV.	   1095	   (2002)	   (arguing	   that	   because	   the	   DMCA	  protections	   for	   copyright	   holders	   seems	   ripe	   for	   abuse,	   limits	   on	   overreaching	   beyond	   the	  scope	  of	  copyright	  could	  be	  imposed	  by	  applying	  the	  misuse	  doctrine	  post-­‐DMCA).	  163. 	   See	   generally	   Paul	   Goldstein,	   Copyright	   on	   a	   Clean	   Slate,	   48	   HOUS.	   L.	   REV.	   691	  (2011).	   Professor	   Goldstein	   offers	   basic,	   substantive,	   wholesale	   changes	   in	   the	   copyright	  architecture	  itself	  rather	  than	  specific	  doctrinal	  reforms	  within	  the	  existing	  framework.	  	  But	  see	  Pamela	  Samuelson	  et	   al.,	  The	  Copyright	  Principles	  Project:	  Directions	   for	  Reform,	   25	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	   L.J.	   1175	   (2010)	   (arguing	   that	   “although	   copyright	   law	   today	  works	   reasonably	  well	   in	  some	   domains,	   it	   can	   be	   improved	   and	   should	   be	   refined	   in	   light	   of	   dramatic	   technological	  advances”).	  	  Id.	  at	  1176.	  164. 	  See	   infra	  Part	   III	   for	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  Semiconductor	  Chip	  Protection	  Act	  as	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  hybrid	  regime.	  165. 	  For	  a	  detailed	  history	  of	  music	  sampling	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  hip	  hop	  culture	  and	  its	  role	  in	  innovative	  music	  creation.	  See	  generally	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4.	  166. Weiser,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  553	  (citations	  omitted).	  167. See	  id.	  168. Kewanee	  Oil	  Co.	  v.	  Bicron	  Corp.,	  416	  U.S.	  470,	  476	  (1974).	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known	  product	  and	  working	  backward	  to	  divine	  the	  process	  which	  aided	  in	   its	   development	   or	  manufacture.”169	   	   The	   underlying	   goal	   of	   reverse	  engineering	   appears	   to	   be	   two-­‐fold.170	   	   First,	   is	   to	   determine	   whether	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  have	  been	  infringed.171	  	  Second,	  is	  to	  develop	  competing	   or	   interoperable	   products.172	   	   However,	   the	   fundamental	  purpose	  is	  discovery,	  “albeit	  of	  a	  path	  already	  taken.”173	  The	   process	   of	   reverse	   engineering	   occurs	   when,	   through	   a	   valid	  transfer	  of	  a	  publicly	  available	  product,	  that	  product	  is	  examined	  directly	  to	   determine	   its	   overall	   composition,	   component	   parts,	   technology,	   and	  any	   other	   characteristics	   that	   allow	   it	   to	   function.174	   	   The	   reverse	  engineer	  deconstructs	  the	  product	  to	  examine	  and	  determine	  how	  it	  was	  created.175	   	   Through	   this	   process,	   a	   competitor	   is	   able	   to	   uncover	  manufacturing	   and	   design	   secrets	   to	   use	   in	   her	   own	   innovations	   as	   a	  result	  of	  reverse	  engineering	  an	  existing	  product.176	  Reverse	  engineering	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  right	   in	  trade	  secret	   law177	  and	   is	   deemed	   a	   lawful	   and	   fair	   means	   to	   compete	   by	   acquiring	   trade	  secret	   information	   about	   an	   invention.178	   The	   Supreme	   Court	  characterized	  reverse-­‐engineering	  as	  “an	  essential	  part	  of	  innovation.”179	  Copyright	   law	   has	   recognized	   reverse	   engineering	   for	   computer	  programs	   under	   the	   fair	   use	   and	   misuse	   doctrines.180	   	   However,	   no	  reverse	   engineering	   right	   exists	   in	   the	   traditional	   patent	   law	   context	  
 169. See	  id.	  170. See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  897.	  171. See	  J.T.	  Westermeier,	  Reverse	  Engineering,	  984	  PLI/PAT	  289,	  293	  (2009).	  	  172. See	  id.	  at	  n.171.	  173. JAMES	  POOLEY,	  TRADE	  SECRET	  §	  5.02	  at	  5–19	  (2012).	  174. 10	  Hawkland	  UCC	  Series	  UCITA	  §	  118:1	  (West	  2011).	  175. Francis	  H.	  Hare,	   Jr.	  &	   James	  L.	  Gilbert,	   §	  6:26.	  Reverse	  Engineering:	  An	   argument	  against	  the	  manufacturer	  obtaining	  a	  protective	  order.	  176. Id.	  177. A	  trade	  secret	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “any	  information	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  business	  or	  other	  enterprise	  and	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  valuable	  and	  secret	  to	  afford	  an	  actual	  or	  potential	  economic	  advantage	  over	  others.”	  Restatement	  (third)	  of	  Unfair	  Competition	  §	  39	  (1995).	  	  It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  trade	  secrets	  to	  have	  an	  overlap	  with	  copyright	  or	  patent.	  Craig	  L.	  Uhrich,	  The	  Economic	  Espionage	  Act-­‐	  Reverse	  Engineering	  and	   the	   Intellectual	  Property	  Public	  
Policy,	  7	  MICH.	  TELECOMM.	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  147,	  165	  (2001).	  178. See	  Pamela	  Samuelson	  and	  Suzanne	  Schotchmer,	  The	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  Reverse	  
Engineering,	  111	  YALE.	  L.	  J.	  1575,	  1583	  (2002).	  	  See	  Bonito	  Boats,	  109	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  986;	  Kewanee	  Oil	  Co.	  v.	  Bicron	  Corp.,	  94	  S.	  Ct.	  1879	  (1974);	  Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  17.	  (“Under	  trade	  secret	  law,	  there	  is	  no	  question	  that	  reverse	  engineering	  is	  legal.”).	  179. 	  See	  Bonito	  Boats,	  109	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  982.	  180. 	  Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  17–18.	  See	  Sega	  Enters.,	  Ltd.	  v.	  Accolade,	   Inc.,	  785	  F.	   Supp.	   1392,	   1399	   (N.D.	  Cal.	   1992),	  aff'd	   in	   part,	   rev'd	   in	   part,	   977	  F.2d	  1510	   (9th	  Cir.	  1993)	   (reverse	  engineering	   to	  develop	  non-­‐infringing	   competing	  or	   compatible	   software	   is	   a	  fair	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  software).	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(although	  it	  is	  also	  not	  expressly	  prohibited).181	  The	   right	   to	   reverse	   engineer	   does	   not	   exist	   in	   patent	   law	   because	  disclosure	  of	  patent	  specifications	  is	  required.	  	  Disclosure	  makes	  reverse	  engineering	  a	  patented	   invention	  unnecessary	  because	   the	  disclosure	   in	  the	  patent	  application	  should	  provide	  sufficient	  information	  about	  how	  to	  make	   the	   invention.182	   	   This	   is	   known	   commonly	   as	   the	   test	   of	  enablement;	   that	   is,	   whether	   the	   disclosure,	   when	   filed,	   “contained	  sufficient	   information	   regarding	   the	   subject-­‐matter	   of	   the	   claims	   as	   to	  enable	   one	   skilled	   in	   the	   pertinent	   art	   to	   make	   and	   use	   the	   claimed	  invention.”183	  Accordingly,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   reverse	   engineer	   a	   traditionally	  manufactured	   invention	   that	   is	   readily	   apparent	   and	   embodied	   in	   the	  invention	  (a	  car,	  airplane	  or	  axiomatic	  widget,	  for	  example).184	  	  Of	  course,	  one	   who	   purchases	   a	   product	   containing	   a	   patented	   invention	   may	  lawfully	   disassemble	   it	   under	   the	   first	   sale	   principle.185	   	   However,	   if	  through	  a	  process	  of	  reverse	  engineering	  a	  second-­‐comer	  makes	  or	  uses	  patented	   subject	  matter,	   such	   is	   deemed	   an	   infringement	   of	   a	   patented	  invention	  (unless	  an	  exception	  or	  affirmative	  right	  applies	  based	  on	   the	  product	  involved).186	  
A.	  	  Reverse	  Engineering	  in	  the	  Traditional	  Manufacturing	  Context	  The	   process	   of	   reverse	   engineering	   varies	   depending	   on	   the	   item	  
 181. 	   See	   Cohen	   &	   Lemley,	   supra	   note	   81,	   at	   6–7	   (noting	   that	   although	   no	   reverse	  engineering	  right	  exists,	  patent	  law	  does	  contain	  other	  limiting	  doctrines	  such	  as	  “experimental	  use”	  and	  “exhaustion”).	  182. 	  Samuelson	  &	  Scotchmer,	  supra	  note	  178,	  at	  1584.	  183. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  112.	  184. 	  Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  6.	  185. 	  Samuelson	  &	  Scotchmer,	  supra	  note	  178,	  at	  1584.	  186. 	   1	   ROGER	  M.	  MILGRIM,	  MILGRIM	   ON	   TRADE	   SECRETS	   §	  1.05[5]	   (1999).	   The	  Manual	   of	  Patent	  Examining	  Procedure	  provides:	  The	   standard	   for	   determining	   whether	   the	   specification	   meets	   the	   enablement	  requirement	  was	   cast	   in	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   decision	   of	  Mineral	   Separation	   v.	  Hyde,	  242	  U.S.	  261,	  270	  (1916)	  which	  postured	  the	  question:	  is	  the	  experimentation	  needed	  to	  practice	  the	  invention	  undue	  or	  unreasonable?	  	  That	  standard	  is	  still	  the	  one	  to	  be	  applied.	   	   In	   re	   Wands,	   858	   F.2d	   731,	   737,	   8	   USPQ2d	   1400,	   1404	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   1988).	  	  Accordingly,	  even	  though	  the	  statute	  does	  not	  use	  the	  term	  "undue	  experimentation,"	  it	  has	  been	  interpreted	  to	  require	  that	  the	  claimed	  invention	  be	  enabled	  so	  that	  any	  person	   skilled	   in	   the	   art	   can	   make	   and	   use	   the	   invention	   without	   undue	  experimentation.	   In	   re	  Wands,	   858	  F.2d	   at	   737,	   8	  USPQ2d	  at	   1404	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   1988).	  	  See	  also	  United	  States	   v.	  Telectronics,	   Inc.,	  857	  F.2d	  778,	  785,	  8	  USPQ2d	  1217,	  1223	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1988)	  ("The	  test	  of	  enablement	  is	  whether	  one	  reasonably	  skilled	  in	  the	  art	  could	   make	   or	   use	   the	   invention	   from	   the	   disclosures	   in	   the	   patent	   coupled	   with	  information	  known	  in	  the	  art	  without	  undue	  experimentation.").	  	  MPEP	  (8th	  ed.	  Rev.	  8,	  July	  2010).	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being	   examined.187	   	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   automotive	   manufacturing	  industry,	   a	   competitor	   might	   disassemble	   a	   vehicle	   to	   discover	   its	  component	   parts.	   	   Those	   parts,	   in	   turn,	   are	   analyzed	   so	   that	   the	  competitor	  can	  develop	  similar,	  better,	  or	   less	  expensive	  components	  to	  be	   used	   in	   the	   competitor’s	   vehicles.188	   	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   more	   efficient	  product,	   a	   benefit	   to	   the	   consumer	   (a.k.a.	   end	   user).	   	   And	   in	   the	  complicated	   mechanical	   engineering	   industries	   of	   aircrafts	   and	   guided	  missiles,	  reverse	  engineering	  can	  be	  difficult	  and	  that	  difficulty	  creates	  an	  incentive	   for	   innovation	  due	   to	   the	   long	   lead-­‐time	  given	   to	   the	   inventor	  before	  a	  second-­‐comer	  can	  enter	  the	  market.189	  
B.	  	  Reverse	  Engineering	  in	  the	  Digital	  Context	  The	  digital	  environment	  presents	  unique	  concerns	  regarding	  whether	  reverse	  engineering	  should	  be	  permitted	  because	  reverse	  engineering	  of	  traditionally	  manufactured	  goods	  is	  different	  from	  reverse	  engineering	  of	  products	   in	   the	   digital	  market.190	   	   The	   question	   of	  whether	   software	   is	  patentable	   subject	   matter,	   whether	   wise	   or	   foolhardy,	   is	   a	   foregone	  conclusion.191	   	   But,	   whether	   reverse	   engineering	   of	   software	   should	   be	  permitted	   is	   a	   question	  open	   for	  debate.	   	   Professors	  Cohen	  and	  Lemley	  assert	   two	   main	   justifications	   to	   defend	   the	   importance	   of	   reverse	  engineering	   in	   the	   computer	   software	   context:	   to	   preserve	   competition	  and	   compatibility.192	   	   Other	   noted	   commentators	   have	   argued	   that	  reverse	  engineering	  has	  a	  competitively	  healthy	  and	  beneficial	  role	  in	  the	  case	   of	   digital	   goods	   and	   assert	   the	   better	   course	   is	   to	   regulate	   post-­‐reverse	   engineering	   activities	   rather	   than	   the	   process	   of	   reverse	  engineering	  itself.193	  When	   a	   traditionally	   manufactured	   good	   enters	   the	   market,	   the	  inventive	   know-­‐how	   invested	   to	   produce	   that	   product	   (beyond	  what	   is	  
 187. Craig	   L.	   Uhrich,	   The	   Economic	   Espionage	   Act-­‐Reverse	   Engineering	   and	   the	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Public	  Policy,	  7	  MICH.	  TELECOMM.	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  147,	  156	  (2001).	  188. See	  Hare	  &	  Gilbert,	   supra	  note	  175,	  at	  §	  6:26.	   	  See	  also	  Uhrich,	   supra	  note	  187,	  at	  156.	  The	  author	  describes	  other	  examples	  of	  reverse	  engineering	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  context.	  For	  example,	  reverse	  engineering	  is	  also	  used	  for	  mechanical	  devices	  such	  as	  turbine	  or	  cargo	  containers.	   In	   that	   context	   reverse	   engineering	   involves	   taking	   detailed	   sketches,	  measurements	  or	  physically	  taking	  apart	  the	  actual	  container.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  common	  areas	  reverse	   engineering	   is	   used	   in	   is	   the	   software	   industry	   where	   a	   computer	   chip	   is	   stripping	  away	  its	  layers	  to	  study	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  chip.	  	  189. Richard	  C.	  Levin,	  Patents	  in	  Perspective,	  53	  ANTITRUST	  L.	  J.	  519,	  521	  (1984).	  190. Samuelson	  &	  Scotchmer,	  supra	  note	  178,	  at	  1579.	  191. Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  8.	  192. Id.	   at	   21	   (asserting	   that	   “[i]n	   markets	   characterized	   by	   network	   effects,	   such	   as	  software,	  this	  latter	  objective	  [preserving	  compatibility]	  is	  particularly	  important.”).	  193. Samuelson	  &	  Scotchmer,	  supra	  note	  178,	  at	  1652.	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disclosed,	  as	  noted	  below)	  remains	  at	  the	  factory,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  Therefore,	  only	  a	  minimal	  amount	  of	  know-­‐how	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  acquired	  (at	  least	  quickly)	   through	   the	  process	  of	   reverse	  engineering.194	   	  Products	   in	   the	  digital	   market,	   however,	   often	   have	   a	   large	   quantity	   of	   know-­‐how	  embedded	   in	   the	   product	   itself	   that	   can	   be	   easily	   accessed	   through	   the	  process	   of	   reverse	   engineering.195	   	   The	   copyrightable	   expression	   and	  non-­‐protectable	  elements	  (i.e.,	  those	  elements	  that	  fall	  under	  102(b)	  and	  outside	   of	   copyright	   protection)	   are	   inextricably	   linked	   in	   the	   physical	  copy.196	   	   The	   object	   code	   is	   indecipherable	   to	   humans	   and	   therefore	  cannot	  be	  understood	  until	   first	  accessed.197	   	  However,	  before	  computer	  programmers	   sought	   copyright	   protection	   for	   computer	   programs,	   it	  seems	  the	  copyright	  regime	  had	  little	  need	  for	  reverse	  engineering.198	  Copying	   in	   the	   process	   of	   reverse	   engineering	   digital	   goods	   is	  considered	   fair	   use	   under	   certain	   circumstances.199	   	   For	   example,	   the	  practice	   is	   prevalent	   in	   the	   video	   game	   industry.	   A	   key	   goal	   of	   any	  successful	  video	  game	  developer	  is	  the	  cumulative	  development	  of	  ideas	  based	  on	  existing	  games	  to	  design	  a	  new	  game	  deemed	  as	  good	  as	  or	  even	  better	   than	   that	   of	   the	   first-­‐comer.200	   	   Such	   a	   goal	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	  intellectual	   property	   law	   as	   well,	   to	   promote	   progress	   in	   society	   by	  improving	   the	   lives	   of	   its	   citizens	   through	   cultural	   enrichment	   and	  improving	   the	   goods	   (whether	   creative	   or	   inventive)	   they	   use	   and	  consume.	  Three	   cases	   established	   early	   in	   the	   industry’s	   development	   that	  reverse	  engineering	  of	  software	  components	   in	  video	  game	  hardware	   is	  permissible	  under	  copyright	  law,	  even	  if	   intermediate	  copying	  occurs.201	  	  
Sega	  Enterprises	  v.	  Accolade,	  Inc.,202	  is	  the	  most	  often	  cited	  of	  the	  trio.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  held	  that	  reverse	  engineering	  is	  permissible	  if	  it	   provides	   access	   to	   non-­‐protectable	   elements	   and	   the	   copier	   has	   a	  “legitimate	  reason”	  to	  copy.203	  
 194. Id.	  at	  1579.	  195. Id.	  196. See	  Craig	  Zieminski,	  Game	  Over	  for	  Reverse	  Engineering?,	  13	  J.	  TECH.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  289,	  296	  (2008).	  197. See	  id.	  at	  296.	  198. See	  id.	  at	  294.	  199. See	  id.	  200. Joe	   Linhoff,	   Video	   Games	   &	   Reverse	   Engineering:	   Before	   and	   After	   the	   Digital	  
Millennium	  Copyright	  Act,	  3	  J.	  TELECOMM.	  &	  HIGH	  TECH.	  L.	  209,	  220	  (2004).	  201. Zieminski,	  supra	  note	  196,	  at	  294.	  202. Sega	  Enters.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Accolade,	  Inc.,	  977	  F.2d	  1510	  (9th	  Cir.	  1992).	  203. See	  Zieminski,	  supra	  note	  196,	  at	  295.	  Sega	  was	  decided	  before	  Congress	  enacted	  the	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	   (“DMCA”).	   	  However,	   Congress	  made	   clear	   its	   intent	   to	  codify	  the	  holding.	  	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  DMCA	  as	  applied	  is	  far	  more	  restrictive	  of	  reverse	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Some	   commentators	   assert	   that	   reverse	   engineering	   is	   one	   of	   the	  primary	   reasons	   the	   video	   game	   industry	   has	   been	   so	   successful	   in	  innovation	  and	  rapid	  development.204	   	  One	  explanation	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  reverse	   engineering	   uncovers	  multiple	   aspects	   of	   the	   game	   designs	   not	  readily	   apparent	   on	   the	   surface.205	   	   Through	   reverse	   engineering,	   a	  developer	  can	  study	  a	  game’s	   inner-­‐workings	  through	  a	   frame-­‐by-­‐frame	  analysis	  and	  track	  every	  detail	  and	  every	  change.206	  As	  with	   other	   types	   of	   digital	   files,	   a	   digital	  music	   recording	   can	   be	  “reverse	   engineered”	   as	   well—that	   is,	   accessed	   and	   studied	   to	   reveal	  hidden	  information	  that	  exists	  within	  the	  recording	  itself.207	  	  Such	  action	  can	  “quickly	  identify,	  select	  and	  isolate	  interesting	  features	  in	  a	  mix,	  such	  as	   individual	   notes,	   instruments	   and	   voices.”208	   	   Digital	   reverse	  engineering	   of	   music	   allows	   a	   reverse	   engineer	   to	   look	   at	   the	  hexadecimal	  code209	  and	  through	  that	  code	  identify,	  among	  other	  things,	  what	  program	  was	  used	   to	  create	   the	  work	  and	  which	  add-­‐ons	  or	  plug-­‐ins	   may	   run	   in	   concert.210	   	   With	   this	   know-­‐how,	   a	   second-­‐generation	  music	   producer	   can	   do	   what	   innumerable	   creatives	   like	   Public	   Enemy	  have	   done	   throughout	   the	   ages—use	   technology	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   musical	  production	   and,	   in	   fact,	   a	  musical	   instrument	   to	   repurpose,	   revise,	   and	  innovatively	   create	   something	  new	   from	   the	   stock	   in	   trade	   that	   already	  exists.	  
 engineering	  than	  the	  practice	  was	  under	  the	  rule	  set	  forth	  in	  Sega.	  	  Id.	  204. 	  Cohen	  &	  Lemley,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  3	  (noting	  the	  software	  industry	  “is	  characterized	  by	  rapid	  sequential	  innovation,	  reuse	  and	  re-­‐combination	  of	  components,	  and	  strong	  network	  effects	   that	   privilege	   interoperable	   components	   and	   products.”);	   Linhoff,	   supra	   note	   200,	   at	  214.	  	  205. 	  Linhoff,	  supra	  note	  200,	  at	  220.	  206. 	  Id.	  207. 	   James	  Griffin,	  Copyright	   in	  Music:	  A	  Role	   for	   the	  Principles	  of	  Reverse	  Engineering,	  30	  LEGAL.	  STUD.	  653,	  664	  (2010).	  208. 	  Id.	  209. 	  The	  term	  hexadecimal	  literally	  means	  “of,	  relating	  to,	  or	  based	  on	  the	  number	  16.”	  ANSWERS.COM,	  http://www.answers.com/topic/hexadecimal	   (last	  visited	  Mar.	  28,	  2012).	   	  The	  hexadecimal	  code	  comes	  from	  the	  system	  of	  the	  same	  name.	  	  Webopedia	  explains	  that	  the	  term	  “[r]efers	  to	  the	  base-­‐16	  number	  system,	  which	  consists	  of	  16	  unique	  symbols:	  the	  numbers	  0	  to	  9	   and	   the	   letters	   A	   to	   F.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   decimal	   number	   15	   is	   represented	   as	   F	   in	   the	  hexadecimal	   numbering	   system.	   	   The	   hexadecimal	   system	   is	   useful	   because	   it	   can	   represent	  every	   byte	   (8	   bits)	   as	   two	   consecutive	   hexadecimal	   digits.	   	   It	   is	   easier	   for	   humans	   to	   read	  hexadecimal	   numbers	   than	   binary	   numbers.”	   WEBOPEDIA,	  http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/hexadecimal.html	  (last	  visited	  Oct.	  17,	  2011).	  210. 	  Griffin,	  supra	  note	  207,	  at	  664.	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C.	  	  Reverse	  Engineering	  &	  Copyright	  1.	  	  Fair	  Use	  In	  addition	  to	  some	  protection	  for	  reverse	  engineering	  under	  section	  117	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act,211	  case	  law	  has	  also	  protected	  as	  fair	  use	  certain	  intermediate	   copies	   in	   software	   development	   made	   in	   the	   creative	  process.212	   	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   uniformly	   applied	   across	   all	   types	   of	  copyright	   subject	   matter	   and	   no	   court	   has	   held	   that	   all	   reverse	  engineering	   is	   necessarily	   a	   fair	   use.	   To	   be	   considered	   fair,	   the	   act	   of	  reverse	   engineering	   (at	   least	   conceptually)	   must	   help	   to	   uncover	   un-­‐protectable	  elements	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  not	  readily	  apparent.213	  	  In	  this	  way,	  intermediate	  copying	  is	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  a	  private	  benefit	  to	  the	  copyist,	  but	  also	  of	  benefit	   to	   society.214	   	   Society	  benefits	  by	   the	   further	  dissemination	  of	  unprotected	   ideas	  and	  processes	  embodied	   in	   creative	  products	  distributed	  by	  sale	  in	  the	  mass	  market.215	  Judges	   called	   on	   to	   interpret	   and	   apply	   copyright	   law	   and	   to	   assess	  fair	   use	   have	   often	   developed	   industry-­‐specific	   rules	  within	   and	   across	  creative	  genres	  to	  address	  unique	  considerations.	  For	  example,	  the	  court	  in	  A.A.	  Hoehling	   v.	   Universal	   City	   Studios,	   Inc.216	   noted	   that	   broad	   use	   of	  existing	   historical	   works	   should	   be	   granted	   to	   second-­‐generation	  borrowing	   authors	   who	   use	   historical	   subject	   matter	   in	   later	   works,	  including	  theories	  or	  plots.217	  Because	   the	   current	   copyright	   system	  has	  already	   struggled	   to	  keep	  pace	   with	   the	   challenges	   that	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   technologies	   have	  presented	   to	   existing	   (and	   arguably	   dated)	   laws,	   and	   piecemeal	  
 211. The	   “archival”	   privilege	   to	   create	   backup	   copies	   of	   computer	   software	   is	   an	  exception	  to	  the	  exclusive	  reproduction	  right	  provided	  in	  §106	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  §	  117	  privilege	  extends	  only	  to	  computer	  programs	  and	  not	  to	  other	  types	  of	  works.	  	  It	  permits	  an	  owner	  of	  a	  legal	  copy	  of	  an	  original	  computer	  program	  to	  copy	  without	  permission	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  if	  the	  new	  copy	  is	  being	  made	  for	  archival	  (i.e.,	  backup)	  purposes	  and	  the	  archival	  copy	  is	  either	  destroyed,	  or	  transferred	  with	  the	  original	  copy,	  once	  the	  original	  copy	  is	  sold,	  given	  away,	  or	  otherwise	  transferred.	  212. LCOMTECH	  §	  1:118	  (reverse	  engineering	  under	  copyright).	  213. See	  Sega	  Enters.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Accolade,	  Inc.,	  977	  F.2d	  1510,	  1518	  (9th	  Cir.	  1992).	  	  See	  also	  Bateman	   v.	   Mnemonics,	   Inc.,	   79	   F.3d	   1532,	   38	   U.S.P.Q.2d	   (BNA)	   1225	   (11th	   Cir.	   1996)	  (“[A]lthough	   there	  has	  been	   some	  uncertainty	   as	   to	  whether	   reverse	   engineering	   constitutes	  copyright	  infringement	  .	  .	  .	  We	  find	  the	  Sega	  opinion	  persuasive	  in	  view	  of	  the	  principal	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  and	  the	  arts.”).	  	  214. See	   LCOMTECH,	   supra	   note	   212	   (noting	   that	   “while	   intermediate	   copying	   yields	   a	  private	  benefit,	  it	  also	  promotes	  a	  public	  interest.”).	  215. See	  id.	  	  216. Hoehling	  v.	  Universal	  City	  Studios,	  Inc.,	  618	  F.2d	  972	  (2d	  Cir.),	  cert	  denied,	  449	  U.S.	  841	  (1980).	  217. Id.	  at	  978.	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amendments	   have	   obscured	  both	   clear	   delineations	   and	   an	   appropriate	  balance	   between	   exclusive	   rights	   and	   access,	   copyright	   should	   be	  reverse-­‐engineered	   so	   that	   patent	   policy	   serves	   as	   a	   guidepost	   for	  copyright	  reformers	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  individual	  benefits	  and	  the	  benefits	  to	   society	   of	   a	   legal	   framework	   that	   values	   and	   protects	   cumulative	  creation	   in	   the	   copyright	   context.	   	   Any	   substantive	   reform	   should	  consider	  policies	  supporting	  reverse	  engineering	  in	  the	  inventive	  context	  to	   incentivize	   cumulative	   creation	   to	   bolster	   robust	   innovation.	  	  Copyright	   reform,	   in	   this	   regard,	  may	  well	  have	   to	  yield	   to	  some	  hybrid	  legislative	  framework.	  	  Precedent	  for	  such	  a	  sui	  generis	  approach	  already	  exists;	   the	   Chip	   Act	   is	   an	   example	   of	   such	   an	   intellectual	   property	  hybrid.218	  Both	  historical	  and	  current	   concepts	  of	   copyright	  are	  premised	  on	  a	  paradigm	   that	   presumes	   incorrectly	   that	   borrowing	   is	   generally	  antithetical	   to	  creativity	  and	   innovation	  and	  that	  creative	  works	  worthy	  of	  protection	  are	  always	  created	   independently.219	   	  The	  unsubstantiated	  presumption	   of	   the	   value	   of	   independent	   creation	   has	   disregarded	   the	  importance	   of	   copying	   in	   the	   creative	   process	   and	   has	   left	   its	   value	  “under-­‐appreciated	   and	   under-­‐theorized”	   in	   copyright	   jurisprudence.220	  	  Patent	   law	   and	   policy,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   supports	   and	   encourages	  further	   innovation	  and	  thereby	  seems	  to	  demonstrate	  greater	   fidelity	  to	  its	   Constitutional	   call	   for	   progress	   in	   the	   inventive	   context	   than	   does	  copyright.	  2.	  	  The	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  The	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  (“DMCA”)	  expressly	  provides	  a	  limited	  exception	  to	  reverse	  engineer.	  Specifically,	  section	  1201(f)	  allows	  a	   second-­‐comer	   to	   reverse	   engineer	   software	   to	   create	   interoperable	  programs.	   	  The	   legislative	  history	  makes	   clear	   that	   this	   exception	   is	   for	  the	  purpose	  of	  creating	  something	  new	  and	  not	  simply	  to	  decrypt,	  access,	  and	   copy	   the	   existing	   software,	  which	  presumably	  would	   lead	   to	   unfair	  practices	   and	   potential	   market	   harm.221	   	   In	   this	   context,	   therefore,	  reverse	   engineering	   is	   encouraged	   and	   valued	   as	   an	   “intermediate”	  
 218. See	  infra	  Part	  III	  D.	  219. Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  863.	  220. Arewa,	   supra	   note	   103,	   at	   482	   (citing	   Julie	   E.	   Cohen,	   Creativity	   and	   Culture	   in	  
Copyright	  Theory,	  40	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  1151,	  1152	  (2007)	  (other	  citations	  omitted)).	  221. See	  Jane	  C.	  Ginsburg,	  Copyright	  Use	  and	  Excuse	  on	  the	  Internet,	  24	  COLUM.-­‐VLA	  J.L	  &	  ARTS	  1,	  7	   (2000)	   (noting	   that	   “the	   legislative	  history	  made	  clear	   that	   the	   reverse	  engineering	  exception	   was	   added	   to	   permit	   circumvention	   of	   access	   controls	   on	   computer	   programs	   in	  order	   to	   promote	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   computer	   programs,	   not	   to	   promote	   circumvention	   of	  access	  controls.”).	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creative	   step	   toward	   a	   new	   expression	   of	   creativity.	   	   Accordingly,	  encouraging	  reverse	  engineering	  in	  this	  regard	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  type	  of	  cultural	  and	  artistic	  progress	  intended	  as	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	  for	  copyright	  protection.222	  
D.	  	  The	  Chip	  Act	  In	   1984,	   Congress	   and	   the	   semi-­‐conductor	   chip	   industry	   recognized	  both	   the	   value	   and	   limitations	   of	   a	   singular	   traditional	   intellectual	  property	   approach	   to	   the	   unique	   issues	   presented	   by	   that	   industry.	  	  Accordingly,	   Congress	  developed	   a	   sui	   generis	   framework	   incorporating	  aspects	   of	   copyright	   and	   patent	   law	   to	   address	   those	   industry-­‐specific	  concerns	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  at	  once	  both	  the	  optimal	  protection	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  and	  the	  optimal	  space	  for	  second-­‐generation	  innovators	  to	  innovate	  further.223	  	  Despite	  the	  purportedly	  inconsequential	  impact	  of	  the	   Chip	   Act	   on	   the	   semi-­‐conductor	   chip	   industry,	   the	   similarities	  between	  the	  concerns	  in	  the	  semi-­‐conductor	  and	  fair	  use	  reliant	  mediums	  like	   appropriation	   art	   based	   largely	   on	   cumulative	   creation	  may	   prove	  illustrative	  if	  (or	  more	  likely	  when)	  Congress	  reforms	  copyright	  law.	  The	   Chip	   Act’s	   express	   reverse	   engineering	   provision	   allows	   a	  competitor	   to	   reproduce	   a	   mask224	   without	   the	   owner’s	   permission	   in	  order	   to	   analyze	   it.	   	   Although	   analogous	   to	   the	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   in	  copyright	   law,	   the	   Chip	   Act’s	   reverse	   engineering	   provision	   goes	  much	  further	   to	   permit	   second-­‐comers	   to	   incorporate	   the	   results	   of	   their	  analysis	  into	  a	  subsequent	  original	  work;	  that	  is,	  to	  appropriate	  the	  result	  into	  a	  new	  work	  for	  purposes	  of	  further	  innovation.225	  	  This,	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  desirable	  result.	  The	  Chip	  Act	  is	  illustrative	  of	  a	  legislative	  framework	  Congress	  could	  create	   to	   sample	   patentesque	   policies	   regarding	   access	   of	   protected	  works	  to	  remix	  the	  copyright	  regime.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  might	  encourage	  and	  privilege	   a	   wider	   universe	   of	   collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   creative	  methods	   and	   resulting	   works,	   the	   type	   of	   which	   societal	   progress	   is	  
 222. Id.	  223. See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  896.	  224. A	  "mask	  work"	  is	  defined	  as:	  	  [A]	   series	  of	   related	   images,	  however	   fixed	  or	  encoded	   -­‐	   (A)	  having	  or	   representing	  the	   predetermined,	   three-­‐dimensional	   pattern	   of	   metallic,	   insulating,	   or	  semiconductor	  material	  present	  or	  removed	  from	  the	  layers	  of	  a	  semiconductor	  chip	  product;	  and	  (B)	  in	  which	  series	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  images	  to	  one	  another	  is	  that	  each	  image	  has	  the	  pattern	  of	  the	  surface	  of	  one	  form	  of	  the	  semiconductor	  chip	  product.	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  901(2).	  225. Steven	  P.	  Kasch,	  The	  Semiconductor	  Chip	  Protection	  Act:	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  Future,	  7	  HIGH	  TECH.	  L.J.	  71,	  74	  (1992).	  
2013]	   REVERSE	  ENGINEERING	  IP	   97	  
	  
born.226	   	  As	  others	  have	  argued,	   the	  continued	  piecemeal	   tinkering	  with	  the	  existing	  copyright	   framework	   is	  doing	  more	  harm	   than	  good	  due	   to	  the	   long	  history	  of	   legislative	  and	  judicial	  baggage	  that	  comes	  with	  such	  an	  incremental	  approach.227	  PART	  IV:	  	  THE	  IP	  AXIS:	  WHERE	  DISTINCT	  REGIMES	  CONVERGE	  This	  Part	   explores	   the	  blurring	  of	   the	  distinction	  between	   copyright	  and	  patent	  protection	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  	  Additionally,	  this	  Part	  challenges	  historic	   notions	   of	   the	   bright-­‐lined	   semantic	   demarcation	   between	   the	  terms	   “innovation”	   (traditionally	   attributed	   to	   patent	   law)	   and	  “creativity”	   (traditionally	   linked	   to	   copyright	   law).	   	   Because	   intellectual	  property	  laws	  must	  remain	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  to	  reflect	  current	  needs,	  values	   and	   norms,	   the	   time	   has	   come	   for	   a	   new	   intellectual	   property	  regime	   that	   accepts	   that	   the	   historically	   distinct	   regimes	   have	   become	  inextricably	  linked.228	  A	  dividing	  line	  has	  existed	  traditionally	  between	  “products”	  produced	  by	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  activity	  on	  one	  side	  and	  literary	  and	  artistic	  “productions”	   born	   of	   creative	   inspirational	   activity	   on	   the	   other.229	   	   Of	  course,	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  the	  line	  has	  been	  blurred,	  due	  largely	  to	  computer	  software—sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “industrial	  literature”—which	   is	   protected	   to	   some	   extent	   by	   both	   regimes.230	   	   In	   fact,	   the	  classical	   vision	   that	   subdivided	   the	   IP	   regimes	   into	   mutually	   exclusive	  compartments	   for	   industrial	   and	   artistic	   property	   “has	   irretrievably	  
 226. The	   following	   test	   has	   been	   suggested	   to	   ascertain	   when	   and	   whether	   a	   hybrid	  framework	   is	   prudent:	   The	   test	   is	   fourfold,	   and	   asks	   1)	   whether	   the	   new	   right	   will	   fit	  harmoniously	  within	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework	  without	  violating	  any	  basic	  tenets	  of	  law,	  2)	  whether	  the	  new	  right	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  a	  reasonably	  clear	  manner,	  3)	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  advantage	  to	  implementing	  the	  new	  right,	  and	  4)	  whether	  the	  new	  right	  will	  “enrich	  or	  enhance	  the	  aggregate	  public	  domain.”	  See	  Robert	  W.	  Kastenmeier	  &	  Michael	  J.	  Remington,	  The	  
Semiconductor	   Chip	   Protection	   Act	   of	   1984:	   A	   Swamp	   or	   Firm	   Ground?,	   70	  MINN.	   L.	   REV.	   417,	  440–42	  (1985).	  227. Kristen	  Osenga,	  Information	  May	  Want	  To	  Be	  Free,	  But	  Information	  Products	  Do	  Not:	  
Protecting	   And	   Facilitating	   Transactions	   In	   Information	   Products,	   30	   CARDOZO	   L.	   REV.	   2099,	  2138–39	  (2009).	  [T]he	  existing	  regimes	  are	  simply	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  cover	  information	  products	  [which	  I	  call	   digital	   goods],	   even	  with	  modifications.	   If	   these	   systems	  were	   adapted	   to	   cover	  information	  products,	  there	  would	  likely	  be	  too	  much	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  baggage	  accompanying	   the	   new	   right	   and	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   an	   actual	   advantage	   would	   be	  realized.	  	  	  
Id.	  	   228. See	   Reichman,	   supra	   note	   53,	   at	   517–18	   (noting	   that	   numerous	   scholars	   have	  advanced	  a	  “unified	  field”	  approach).	  229. See	  id.	  at	  484.	  230. See	  id.	  at	  485.	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broken	   down.”231	   	   Some	   scholars	   also	   question	   whether	   the	   line	   ever	  existed.232	   Indeed,	   truly	   inspired	   innovation,	   whether	   artistic	   or	  inventive,	  does	  not	  simply	  begin	  and	  end	  in	  one	  hemisphere	  of	  the	  brain	  but	  rather	  from	  “harmonious	  integration	  of	  both.”233	  Copyright	   law	   had	   not	   been	   concerned	   with	   access	   to	   copyrighted	  works	  until	   computer	   software	  was	  deemed	  protectable	   subject	  matter.	  	  The	  copyright	  monopoly	  was	   intentionally	   limited	  to	  allow	  for	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	   ideas,	  procedures,	  processes,	   systems,	  methods	  of	  operation,	  concepts,	  principles,	  and	  discoveries.234	   	  Digital	  goods	  presented	  unique	  problems	   of	   increased	   risk	   of	   substantial	   market	   harm	   because	   of	   the	  ease	  with	  which	  computer	  code	  could	  be	  infringed.	  	  Digital	  goods	  owners	  responded	   by	   creating	   technological	   “fences”	   to	   encrypt	   their	   products	  and	   control	   access	   to	   the	   encrypted	   data	   whether	   or	   not	   otherwise	  protected	  by	  copyright	   (or	  patent,	   for	   that	  matter).	   	  Without	   the	  DMCA,	  users	  and	  competitors	   could	  create	   technological	  measures	   to	   crack	   the	  code	  and	  access	   the	  products	  or	   to	  distribute	  decryption	  tools	   to	  others	  on	  a	  wide	  scale.	   	  The	  DMCA	  provisions	  gave	  rights	  holders	  an	  additional	  means	   to	   protect	   the	   underlying	   rights	   granted	   in	   section	   106	   of	   the	  Copyright	  Act.	  The	   consequences	   of	   legislative	   barriers	   to	   access	   via	   anti-­‐circumvention	   laws,	   however,	   seem	   to	   be	   four-­‐fold.	   	   First,	   access	  protections	   may	   allow	   rights	   holders	   to	   misuse	   the	   monopoly	   by	  preventing	   wholesale	   access	   not	   only	   to	   protectable	   elements	   but	   un-­‐protectable	  elements	  as	  well.235	  	  Armed	  with	  the	  sword	  and	  shield	  of	  the	  DMCA,	  rights	  holders	  can	  use	  a	  number	  of	  technological	  and	  other	  means	  to	  prevent	  or	  severely	  limit	  access	  and	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  in	  ways	  traditional	  copyright	  protection	  does	  not.236	   	  Accordingly,	  otherwise	   fair	  or	   de	  minimis	   uses	   are	   prevented,	   thus	   extending	   legislative	   protection	  
 231. See	   id.	   at	  504–05	  (explaining	   that	   this	   forced	  distinction	  “has	  been	  discredited	  by	  its	   inability	   to	   account	   for,	   or	   adequately	   deal	   with,	   the	   behavior	   of	   so	   many	   commercially	  valuable	  intellectual	  creations	  to	  which	  the	  regimes	  have	  or	  might	  apply.”).	  232. See	  Mandel,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  285	  (challenging	  the	  dichotomy	  as	  erroneous	  because	  invention	  also	  involves	  elements	  of	  creativity	  and	  artistic	  endeavors	  can	  often	  involve	  logical,	  cognitive	  processes).	  233. See	  id.	  at	  286	  (concluding	  the	  “conventional	  story”	  is	  flawed).	  234. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  102(b).	  235. Nicolo	   Zingales,	   B.C.	   INTELL.	   PROP.	   &	   TECH.	   F.	   1,	   6	   (2012)	   (“The	   most	   significant	  concern	  for	  the	  use	  of	  DRM	  is	  one	  that	  is	  often	  subject	  of	  consumers'	  complaints:	  “strategic”	  use	  of	  DRM	  technologies	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  enforce	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  beyond	  their	  scope.).	  236. “Technological	   controls”	   can	   take	  many	   forms	   (like	   hardware,	   software	   or	   some	  combination	  of	   the	   two)	  and	  are	  used	  generally	   “to	  prevent	  access	   to	  digital	   content	  without	  the	  permission	  of	   the	  content	  owner.”	  See	  Dan	  L.	  Burk,	  Anticircumvention	  Misuse,	  50	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  1095,	  1100	  (2003).	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beyond	   what	   may	   be	   reasonable	   or	   necessary	   to	   protect	   against	  widespread	  piracy—both	  nationally	  and	   internationally—as	  well	   as	  any	  substantial	  market	  harm.237	  Second,	   access	   limitations	   stifle	   cumulative	   creative	   effort	   of	   users.	  	  Collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   creation	   are	   an	   established	   normative	  behaviors	   in	   the	   digital	   age,	   especially	   in	   the	   online	   environment.	  	  Examples	   include	   social	   networking,	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   file	   sharing,	   blogging,	  and	   interactive	   gaming.	   	   Further,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   website	   sharing	  buttons	  and	  tools	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  share	  content	  quickly	  with	  the	  click	  of	  a	  button.238	  	  Because	  collaborative	  and	  cumulative	  creative	  efforts	  are	  more	  ubiquitous	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  history	  of	  copyright,	  the	  benefits	  to	  society	  cannot	  be	  denied.	  Third,	   legal	  and	  private	   fences	   lead	  to	   further	  overprotection.239	  The	  breadth	  and	  duration	  of	  copyright	  protection	  already	  significantly	  delays	  placement	   of	   a	   protected	  work	   into	   the	   public	   domain.	   	   The	   DMCA,	   an	  additional	   legal	   fence	   that	   limits	   access	   even	   to	   unprotected	   elements,	  leaves	   even	   less	   “space”	   for	   fair,	   productive,	   and	   beneficial	   uses	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   material	   that	   might	   have	   little	   if	   any	   threat	   to	   market	   harm.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  two	  doctrines	  relied	  on	  by	  second-­‐generation	  creators	  like	  appropriation	   artists—fair	   use	   and	   public	   domain—are	   substantially	  compromised.240	   	   This	   leads	   to	   the	   last	   detrimental	   consequence.	   	   The	  
quid	  pro	  quo	   inherent	   in	   the	   rights/access	  dichotomy	   is	  woefully	  out	  of	  balance,	  especially	  in	  this	  age	  of	  innovative	  creativity	  that	  often	  exists	  at	  the	  access	  of	  IP	  monopolies	  and	  therefore	  implicates	  both	  copyright	  and	  patent	   law.	   	   The	   aforementioned	   consequences	   resulted	   despite	  
 237. See	  id.	  (noting	  overprotection	  concerns	  when	  anti-­‐circumvention	  laws	  are	  relied	  on	  by	  copyright	  holders	  in	  conjunction	  with	  technological	  controls	  to	  enjoy	  a	  heightened	  degree	  of	  control	  not	  attainable	  under	  the	  traditional	  copyright	  regime).	  	  Professor	  Burk	  makes	  another	  important	  point	  about	  the	  DMCA’s	  purported	  benefits	  as	  necessary	  so	  the	  United	  States	  could	  meet	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   Copyright	   Treaty	  (WIPO).	   	  He	  clarifies	   that	  because	  contributory	   infringement	   theories	  already	  protect	  against	  purveyors	   of	   devices	   that	   lack	   “substantial	   non-­‐infringing	   uses”	   the	   urgency	   and	   need	   was	  more	  fiction	  that	  fact.	  	  Id.	  at	  1103.	  	  He	  explains:	  “the	  treaty	  requires	  only	  that	  signatory	  states	  provide	   ‘adequate	   legal	   protection	   and	   effective	   legal	   remedies’	   against	   circumvention	   of	  technological	  controls.”	  	  Id.	  at	  1103–04.	  	  238. See	   Maria	   Konnikova,	   Behind	   The	   “Like”	   Button:	   Why	   We	   Share	   What	   We	   Share,	  BIGTHINK.COM,	   http://bigthink.com/ideas/39779	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	   24,	   2012).	   	   See	   also	   Bilal	  Ahmad,	   The	   Benefits	   of	   Social	   Media	   Optimization,	   TECHMAISH.COM,	  http://www.techmaish.com/benefits-­‐of-­‐social-­‐media-­‐optimization/	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	   24,	  2012).	  239. 	  Zingales,	  supra	  note	  235,	  at	  6.	  240. 	   In	   cases	   involving	   fair	   use	   defenses,	   for	   example,	   courts	   have	   held	   fair	   use	   only	  applies	  to	  certain	  unauthorized	  uses	  of	  copyright	  and	  not	  unauthorized	  access	  to	  a	  copyrighted	  work.	   	   See	   Jacqueline	   Lipton,	   The	   Law	   of	   Unintended	   Consequences:	   The	   Digital	   Millennium	  
Copyright	  Act	  and	  Interoperability,	  62	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  487,	  494	  (2005).	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legislative	  intent	  to	  the	  contrary.241	  CONCLUSION	  Despite	  the	  often-­‐cited	  justifications	  for	  the	  copyright	  monopoly	  born	  out	  of	   the	   Intellectual	  Property	  Clause	  (“IP”	  Clause)	  of	   the	  United	  States	  Constitution242	   to	   promote	   cultural	   progress	   via	   an	   economic	   incentive,	  copyright	   protection	   has	   surpassed	   any	   rational	   understanding	   of	  “copying”	  and	  “limited	  times”	  noted	  in	  the	  IP	  Clause.	  	  Overprotection,	  and	  in	   some	   cases	   misuse,	   has	   led	   to	   a	   diminished	   capacity	   of	   creatives	   to	  incorporate	   existing	  works	   into	  new	  ones	  without	   fear	  of	   legal	   reprisal,	  even	   if	   the	   use	   is	   arguably	   fair	   or	   de	  minimis.	   	   A	   prime	   example	   is	   the	  tenuous	  relationship	  between	  copyright	  law	  and	  appropriation	  art	  forms,	  especially	  digital	  appropriation	  methods	  like	  music	  sampling.243	  Yet,	   patent	   law—born	   of	   the	   same	   IP	   Clause—seems	   to	   have	   fared	  better	  in	  creating	  and	  sustaining	  laws	  and	  policies	  that	  contemplate,	  and	  in	   some	  ways	   protect,	   access	   to	   encourage	   cumulative	   innovation.	   	   The	  concept	  of	  cumulative	  effort	  is	  built	  into	  patent	  law,	  which	  recognizes	  as	  patentable	   subject	   matter	   “any	   new	   and	   useful	   improvement”	   on	   an	  otherwise	  patentable	  invention.244	  
 241. 	  Id.	  at	  494	  (noting	  Congress’s	  express	  intent	  for	  the	  DMCA	  not	  “to	  adversely	  impact	  existing	   limitations	   on	   copyright	   infringement	   and	   defenses	   to	   copyright	   infringement,	   the	  scope	  of	  contributory	  liability	  for	  copyright	  infringement,	  or	  rights	  of	  free	  speech	  in	  relation	  to	  copyright	  works.”)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	  242. 	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8	  cl.	  8.	  The	  clause	  reads:	  	  The	  Congress	  shall	  have	  Power	  To	  lay	  and	  collect	  Taxes,	  Duties,	  Imposts	  and	  Excises,	  to	  pay	   the	  Debts	  and	  provide	   for	   the	  common	  Defence	   [sic.]	   and	  general	  Welfare	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  but	  all	  Duties,	  Imposts	  and	  Excises	  shall	  be	  uniform	  throughout	  the	  United	  States	  .	  .	  .	  [t]o	  promote	  the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts,	  by	  securing	  for	  limited	   Times	   to	   Authors	   and	   Inventors	   the	   exclusive	   Right	   to	   their	   respective	  Writings	  and	  Discoveries.	  	  	  
Id.	   243. 	   “Appropriation”	   as	   defined	   in	   art	   history	   and	   criticism	   disciplines	   “refers	   to	   the	  more	  or	   less	  direct	  taking	  over	  into	  a	  work	  of	  art	  of	  a	  real	  object	  or	  even	  an	  existing	  work	  of	  art.”	   	   TATE.ORG,	   http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=23	   (last	  visited	  Mar.	  18,	  2012).	  For	  a	  more	  complete	  discussion	  of	  appropriation	  art	  and	  copyright	  visit	  
The	   Patry	   Copyright	   Blog,	   PATRY	   COPYRIGHT	   BLOG,	  http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/10/appropriation-­‐art-­‐and-­‐copies.html	   (last	   visited:	  Mar.	   18,	   2012).	   	   See	   	   Kembrew	   McLeod	   &	   Rudolf	   Kuenzli,	   eds.	   Cutting	   Across	   Media:	  
Appropriation	   Art,	   Interventionist	   Collage,	   and	   Copyright	   Law,	   Duke	   University	   Press	   2011	  (addressing	   issues	   of	   appropriation	   in	   popular	   culture	   in	   various	   cultural	   forms	   including	  altered	  billboards	  and	  the	  work	  of	  the	  renowned	  painter	  Chris	  Ofili,	   in	  hip-­‐hop	  music	  and	  the	  compositions	   of	   Bèla	   Bartòk	   and	   Zoltàn	   Kodàly,	   and	   in	   audio	   mash-­‐ups,	   remixed	   news	  broadcasts,	  pranks	  and	  culture	  jamming).	  	  See	  also	  Landes,	  supra	  note	  46	  (examining	  from	  the	  standpoint	   of	   economics	   the	   relationship	   between	   copyright	   law,	   borrowed	   images	   and	  appropriation	  art).	  244. 	   35	   U.S.C.A.	   §	  101	   (Westlaw	   2011)	   (“Whoever	   invents	   or	   discovers	   any	   new	   and	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The	  ability	  of	  the	  patent	  law	  regime,	  in	  its	  purest	  theoretical	  form,	  to	  protect	  and	  encourage	  second-­‐comer	  innovation	  has	  outpaced	  copyright	  law’s	  progress	  in	  that	  regard.	   	  I	  attribute	  such	  a	  result	  to	  the	  underlying	  and,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   misguided	   assumptions	   about	   the	   value	   of	  independent	  creation	  underlying	  the	  copyright	  regime.	  	  This	  assumption	  fails	   to	   appreciate	   how	   some	   types	   of	   literary	   and	   artistic	   works	   are	  created,	  embodied,	  and	  enjoyed,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  digital	  technology	  on	  creative	  productions	  and	  art	  forms	  like	  appropriation	  art.	  	  Such	  methods	   of	   creation	   rely	   primarily	   on	   accessing	   and	   taking	   all	   or	  some	   part	   of	   something	   that	   already	   exists	   and	   incorporating	   it	   into	  something	  altogether	  new.	  As	  technological	  advancements	  continue	  to	  outpace	  in-­‐kind	  legislative	  adjustments,	  the	  need	  becomes	  more	  pressing	  to	  preserve	  the	  legal	  space	  second-­‐comers	   require	   to	   access	   and	   to	   build	   upon	   existing	   creative	  works	   to	   create	   new	   ones.245	   	   Although	   the	   line	   between	   patent	   and	  copyright	   was	   once	   bright,	   clear,	   and	   perhaps	   necessary,	   with	   the	  addition	  of	  software	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  copyright	  and	  enactment	  of	  the	   Digital	   Millennium	   Copyright	   Act,246	   for	   example,	   the	   distinction	  between	   creativity	   (copyright)	   and	   invention	   (patent)	   seems	   to	   have	  been	  irreversibly	  blurred	  as	  well.247	  Clearly,	   the	   copyright	   and	   patent	   monopolies	   each	   rest	   on	  distinguishable	   policy	   goals	   to	   incentivize	   different	   classes	   of	   resulting	  works.248	  	  Copyright	  is	  focused	  on	  original	  artistic	  productions	  and	  patent	  is	  concerned	  with	  novel,	  nonobvious,	  and	  useful	  inventive	  products.	  	  Yet,	  these	  distinct	  paradigms	  share	  a	   common	   theoretical	  and	  constitutional	  bond	   to	   promote	   societal	   progress.	   	   Both	   were	   legislatively	   prescribed	  antidotes	   intended	   to	   cure	   the	   public-­‐goods	   problem	   that	   plagues	  intangible	   and	   inexhaustible	   products.249	   	   Because	   of	   this	   bond,	   both	  
 useful	   process,	   machine,	   manufacture,	   or	   composition	   of	   matter,	   or	   any	   new	   and	   useful	  
improvement	  thereof,	  may	  obtain	  a	  patent	  therefor,	  subject	  to	  the	  conditions	  and	  requirements	  of	  this	  title.”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  245. 	  See	  Evans,	  supra	  note	  4,	  848	  n.24	  [noting	  that	  the	  “rights/access”	  continuum	  refers	  to	   the	  balance	   (or	   imbalance,	  as	   the	  case	  may	  be)	  of	  protection	  of	  a	   creator’s	   rights	  with	   the	  public’s	  access	  to	  her	  creation].	  	  See	  also	  Alina	  Ng,	  Rights,	  Privileges	  and	  Access	  to	  Information,	  42	  LOY.	  U.	  CHI.	  L.J.	  89,	  100	  (2010)	  (“[E]conomic	  growth	  is	  dependent	  not	  only	  on	  the	  production	  and	  dissemination	  of	  information	  to	  society	  but	  also	  on	  society’s	  ability	  to	  generate	  new	  wealth	  from	  existing	  forms	  of	  information.”).	  246. 	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1998,	  Pub.	  L.	  105-­‐304,	  112	  Stat.	  2860	  (Oct.	  28,	  1998),	  17	  U.S.C.	  512,	  1201–05,	  1301–22;	  28	  U.S.C.	  4001.	  247. 	  See	  J.H.	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  53,	  at	  484	  (noting	  the	  “line	  of	  demarcation	  [between	  copyright	   and	  patent	   regimes]	  has	  become	   less	   air	   tight	   and	  unequivocal	   over	   time	   than	   the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  draftsmen	  had	  intended	  cannot	  be	  denied.”).	  248. 	  See	  supra	  Part	  II.	  249. 	  See	  id.	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disciplines	  can	  benefit	   from	   the	  other’s	   lessons	   learned,	  mistakes	  made,	  and	  progress	  achieved.250	  Both	  the	  creative	  process	  itself	  and	  the	  resulting	  creative	  productions	  have	   stressed	   copyright	   law	   in	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   to	   the	   point	   of	  breaking.	  	  With	  the	  increased	  prevalence	  of	  user-­‐as-­‐creator	  a.k.a.	  Cohen’s	  “Romantic	   user,”	   the	   role	   of	   collaboration	   and	   cumulative	   effort	   has	  increased	   in	   importance	   to	   the	   average	   end-­‐user.	   	   Oftentimes	   the	   end-­‐user	  becomes	  the	  creator	  of	  something	  new.251	   	  And,	  as	  noted	   in	  Part	   II,	  even	  the	  statutory	  definitions	  of	  collective	  work	  and	  joint	  work	  in	  the	  Act	  do	   not	   reflect	   reality.	   	   The	   current	   legal	   framework	   fails	   to	   embrace	  cumulative	   creativity	   as	   “progress,”	   or	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   user	  who	   merely	   consumes	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   consumption	   and	   the	   user	   who	  consumes	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   creating	   and	   participating	   in	   the	   cultural	  exchange.252	  The	   confluence	   of	   various	   legal,	   technological,	   and	   contractual	  “fences”	   to	   restrict	   or	   altogether	  prevent	   access	   to	  protected	  works	  has	  led	  to	  a	  shrinking	  fair	  doctrine	  and	  public	  domain.	  	  The	  result?	  	  Valuable	  fundamentally	   fair	   uses	   in	   collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   creative	  mediums	   are	   at	   greater	   risk	   of	   being	   found	   infringing—namely,	  appropriation	   forms	   like	   music	   sampling,	   visual	   collage,	   and	   a	   host	   of	  creative	   endeavors	   on	   the	  worldwide	  web.	   I	   do	   not,	   however,	   advocate	  access	  as	  purely	  “user”	  convenience.	   	  Nor	  do	  I	  give	  a	  green	  light	  to	  mass	  infringement	   and	   uncompensated	   exploitation	   of	   the	   section	   106	   rights	  by	   the	   free-­‐rider	   or	   pirate.	   I	   do	   offer,	   however,	   two	   tentative	   practical	  approaches	  and	  an	  aspirational	  one.	  First,	  I	  suggest	  a	  judicial	  fix	  by	  aggressive	  policing	  of	  misuse.	  	  Second,	  I	  argue	  an	  interim	  legislative	  fix	  to	  expand	  the	  enumerated	  uses	  deemed	  fair	   to	   include	   something	   akin	   to	   a	   reverse	   engineering	   right	   or,	   in	   the	  alternative,	   to	   amend	   section	   107	   to	   provide	   expressly	   that	   fair	   use	  contemplates	  appropriative	  art	  forms	  as	  a	  productive	  use.	  	  Third,	  I	  assert	  that	  any	  piecemeal	  approach	  (as	  that	  just	  offered)	  is	  not	  ideal.	  	  The	  ideal	  is	   a	   sui	   generis	   hybrid	   regime	   consisting	   of	   elements	   of	   patent	   and	  copyright	   to	   apply	   to	   collaborative	   and	   cumulative	   artistic	   mediums—one	   that	   privileges	   access	   for	   purposes	   that	   reflect	   the	   original	  
 250. 	  Gregory	  Mandel	  writes:	  “For	  two	  doctrines	  that	  share	  such	  similar	  objectives,	  it	  is	  striking	  how	   little	  patent	   law	  and	  copyright	  cohere.”	  Mandel,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  288.	   	  See	  also	  John	  Shepard	  Wiley,	  Jr.,	  Copyright	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Patent,	  58	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  119,	  119	  (1991).	  251. 	  See	  Cohen,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  5	  (comparing	  and	  contrasting	  the	  21st	  century	  end-­‐users	   of	   copyright;	   namely	   the	   “romantic	   user”	   who	   copies	   intentionally	   to	   communicate	   a	  critical	  or	  parodic	  message	  and	  the	  “economic	  user”	  who	  engages	  in	  consumptive	  behavior	  and	  seeks	  to	  avoid	  paying	  for	  uses	  they	  believe	  should	  be	  free).	  252. 	  See	  Cohen,	  supra	  note	  19.	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constitutional	   call	   of	   progress,	   the	   true	   “end”	   intended	   to	   justify	   the	  monopolistic	  means.	  	  
